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Reconstructing the Congressional
Guarantee of Republican Government
David S. Louk*
The Republican Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4 promises that
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government.” Although this clause might seem to confer significant
power to oversee the political structures of the states, ambiguity about the
Clause’s meaning, coupled with the Supreme Court’s historic disinclination to
define its contours, have led some observers to question whether the Clause is a
paper tiger. While recent scholarship has focused mostly on what a “Republican
Form of Government” might entail, less attention has been given to the threshold
questions of who might serve as guarantors of the Clause and precisely what
forms of action they might take under it.
This Article concludes that while all federal branches may have a role
to play as guarantors of republican government, the logic, location, and history
of the Republican Guarantee Clause suggest that the Clause most directly
empowers the political branches, and especially Congress, to act as guarantor.
Often forgotten, but of critical importance, is that the Clause served as the chief
constitutional basis for Reconstruction after the Civil War, and it helped pave
the way for ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the
southern states. This history suggests that the Clause and those Amendments—
on which twentieth-century voting rights legislation was based—should be
understood and interpreted in light of one another.
This Article explores the role the Clause might play as an alternative
source of federal legislative power to guarantee basic political processes
alongside—or in place of—these Reconstruction Amendments. These questions
have renewed significance today, given recent and frequent constitutional
confrontations between Congress and the Supreme Court regarding the scope of
Congress’s constitutional power to interpret and enforce the Reconstruction
*
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Jurisprudence & Social Policy Program, UC Berkeley, 2019. For excellent comments, suggestions,
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Amendments. Most recently, in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Court
struck down portions of the Voting Rights Act as extending beyond Congress’s
Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause power. Around the same time, many
state governments began to impose new restrictions on voter registration and
access to the ballot box. These new measures, coupled with the Supreme Court’s
holding in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019) that legal challenges to partisan
gerrymandering are not justiciable in federal courts, has provoked renewed
calls for federal protections to guarantee fairness in state political processes.
Other recent developments, including the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, have also
led to calls for greater congressional oversight of state electoral procedures.
This Article considers whether the Clause might serve as an additional
constitutional basis for federal legislation and explores the interpretive
arguments Congress might raise to justify the power to reform electoral
processes in the states under the Clause. This Article also questions the
prevailing view that the Supreme Court has always treated the Clause as
functionally nonjusticiable. It argues that even following established
precedents, the contemporary Court might well engage with the merits of
legislation and litigation commenced under the Clause, given the Court’s recent
penchant for enhanced scrutiny of congressional enforcement powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments. Such challenges would spark a historical
constitutional confrontation between Congress and the Court as to the meaning
of the Clause. The Court might take one of several approaches when interpreting
Congress’s power to legislate under the Clause, and this Article concludes that
the Clause is the rare constitutional provision that would seem to grant both the
courts and the political branches independent and complementary bases to
guarantee republican government. Judicial scrutiny of congressional actions
taken under the Clause should be heightened when congressional efforts can
more readily be achieved by the states or by the courts and diminished when
only Congress or president could effectively serve as the guarantor.
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The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .
—Article IV, Section 41
INTRODUCTION
The civics-textbook account of the U.S. Constitution is that it
sets out a separation of powers by allocating particular roles and
functions to each of the three branches of government.2 Article I
specifies the legislative powers and responsibilities of Congress, Article
II sets forth the executive powers of the president, and Article III
describes the judicial authority of the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts. Yet the structure of the Constitution is not quite so
straightforward. Section 4 of Article IV, for instance, provides in one
clause that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State . . . a
Republican Form of Government,”3 but the Section fails to clarify the
identity of the guarantor. Which branches and actors may act on behalf
of “The United States,” and what actions may they take to fulfill that
guarantee?
The Republican Guarantee Clause is the only clause in the
Constitution to raise this captivating interpretive problem. It is one
thing to create and assign distinct constitutional powers to each of the
three branches, as the Constitution’s first three articles do. It is quite
another to create a power under the Constitution and fail to clearly
assign it at all: the Clause marks the only place in the originally ratified
Constitution where “[t]he United States” appears in the nominative
form as the subject of a sentence.
The Clause’s textual ambiguity, its location within Article IV,4
and its seemingly broad potential render the Clause something of an
alluring constitutional lacuna. Over the years, scholars have repeatedly
explored possible meanings of the term “Republican Form of

1.
2.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
E.g., BENJAMIN GINSBURG ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
POLITICS 43 (Ann Shin ed., 11th ed. 2017) (“To prevent the new government from abusing its
power, the framers incorporated principles such as the separation of powers (the division of
governmental power among several institutions that must cooperate in decision making) . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)).
3.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
4.
See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1468, 1472–74 (2007) (noting that Article IV of the U.S. Constitution is generally textually vague
as to whether it limits or empowers the federal government’s ability to structure interstate
relations).
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Government,”5 and a few have examined what might it might mean to
make or enforce a “guarantee.”6 Yet the puzzle of what “[t]he United
States” refers to remains underexplored,7 despite posing perhaps the
most critical question about the Clause’s meaning and potential
application. Determining who may serve as the guarantor—whether
that be Congress, the president, the courts, or the states (or even some
combination thereof)—will necessarily shape the potential meanings
and forms such a guarantee might take. Depending on the guarantor,
such actions could, in theory, take the form of legislation enacted by
Congress, an executive order decreed by the president, or an injunction
issued by a court, among other things.
In part due to this unusually open-ended textual ambiguity, the
predominant modern understanding of the Clause is that it is a
potentially attractive yet largely inert constitutional provision. This is
in part because the Clause remains one of the few provisions of the

5.
Most scholars have concluded that the Clause at minimum guarantees some form of
majority rule in the governance of the states. E.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION 67 (1972) (“The guarantee clause emerged from the pages of The Federalist
with its assurance of popular control of government, rule by majorities in the states with
safeguards for the rights of minorities, and emphasis on the substance as well as the form of
republican government . . . .”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government:
Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749
(1994) (concluding that what the Clause does “require is that the structure of day-to-day
government—the Constitution—be derived from ‘the People’ and be legally alterable by a ‘majority’
of them”); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 560 (1962) (“Among such eternal requisites of
republican government might be some sort of effective elections with a fairly large group of society
participating therein . . . .”); Gabriel J. Chin, Justifying a Revised Voting Rights Act: The
Guarantee Clause and the Problem of Minority Rule, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1551, 1562 (2014) (“[T]he
Guarantee Clause was designed to protect majority rule.”); Michael W. McConnell, The
Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103,
114 (2000) (“[A]t a minimum, the Clause must mean that a majority of the whole body of the people
ultimately governs.”); Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause
Regulation of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2010) (“In short, republican
governments rule (1) by the majority (and not a monarch), (2) through elected representatives, (3)
in separate, coequal branches.”). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause
Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 851 (1994) (“[T]he Guarantee Clause should be
regarded as a protector of basic individual rights . . . .”); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Authority: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV 1 (1988) (arguing
that the Clause exists to protect the states from federal overinterference); Robert G. Natelson, A
Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80
TEX. L. REV. 807, 810 (2002) (“[P]erhaps the most durable argument in opposition to citizen
lawmaking is that it violates the Guarantee Clause . . . . Republican lawmaking, the argument
goes, is lawmaking only through legislative representatives. Lawmaking by plebiscite renders the
government a decmocracy rather than a republic.” (footnotes omitted)).
6.
E.g., Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602 (2019).
7.
Several scholars have considered this question with respect to Congress. See Chin, supra
note 5, at 1577–83; Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions
of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 204–05 (2005); Carolyn
Shapiro, Democracy, Federalism, and the Guarantee Clause, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 183 (2020).
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Constitution for which the Supreme Court has never provided a
resounding and affirmative interpretation as to its meaning. Instead,
in several high-profile cases, including 2019’s Rucho v. Common Cause,
the Court has seemed to suggest that the Clause raises nonjusticiable
political questions better suited to the political branches.8 The Court’s
claims about the Clause could be understood broadly, and several
scholars have read those claims to mean that the Clause is
nonjusticiable altogether.9 That interpretation would exclude the courts
from among the Clause’s potential guarantors. After all, if the Clause
is always nonjusticiable, then the courts would have no occasion to
enforce it.10
But if the Clause is not directed at the courts, it raises troubling
interpretive questions. Who may act as the guarantor, what may they
do to enforce the guarantee, and how might the courts review challenges
to those actions, if at all? If “[t]he United States” refers to the political
branches, and if judicial review of claims about the Clause’s meaning
truly are nonjusticiable, then the Clause would seem an invitation for
“legislative
constitutionalism,”
a
form
of
constitutional
departmentalism where “both Congress and the Court should be
regarded as having independent authority to ascertain constitutional
meaning.”11 That reading of the Clause would suggest that Congress
could claim independent—and potentially peremptory—authority to
interpret the Clause’s constitutional meaning in the course of taking
action to fulfill the guarantee. Yet from a twenty-first-century vantage
point, a claim of authoritative extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation seems at odds with the now well-settled doctrine of
8.
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (“This Court has several times
concluded . . . that the Guarantee Clause does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim.”).
9.
E.g., Bonfield, supra note 5, at 554 n.180, 560 (noting courts that have maintained the
nonjusticiability of the Clause and that “since 1912 the Court has denominated all issues raised
under the guarantee clause nonjusticiable”); J. Andrew Heaton, The Guarantee Clause: A Role for
the Courts, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 477, 478 (1986) (“[I]t is the only clause which the Court holds to be
completely nonjusticiable.”); John R. Vile, John C. Calhoun on the Guarantee Clause, 40 S.C. L.
REV. 667, 675 (1989) (concluding that the Court has found the Clause as speaking “solely to
Congress and the President” and that it has “constru[ed] the guarantee clause as a nonjusticiable
provision”); Williams, supra note 6, at 681, 687 (arguing that an “international law interpretation”
of the Clause would “tend[ ] to buttress the judiciary’s longstanding practice of refusing to
adjudicate Guarantee Clause claims”). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 861 (concluding that
it is a “common myth about [the Clause] that it was deemed to be nonjusticiable in 1849 in Luther
v. Borden”).
10. As I will discuss, I believe this view is incorrect, the result of a misunderstanding about
the Court’s justiciability jurisprudence.
11. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2023 (2003)
[hereinafter Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism]; see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions].
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judicial supremacy, whereby the courts—and not the political
branches—are the ultimate arbiters of the Constitution’s meaning.12
This inquiry arises at an especially relevant time. Historically,
higher-profile debates about the Clause’s meaning have been closely
linked to acute moments of contestation about the appropriate role of
the federal government in guaranteeing enfranchisement and fair
political participation in both state and local elections, as well as in
federal elections operated by the states. Debates about the Clause’s
meaning peaked during the mid-nineteenth century and fell into
dormancy after the Civil War. They did so, I will argue, because the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments—whose ratifications during
Reconstruction were substantially aided by the Republican Guarantee
Clause13—provided the federal government with far more specific
enforcement powers to ensure fair political participation and republican
governance in the states.14 Indeed, the ratification of these
Amendments fundamentally redefined the permissible baseline of
republican government for the states under the Constitution.
Yet the full promise of those amendments was largely unfulfilled
for almost a century, impeded in large part by the racial caste systems
of Jim Crow law and Black Codes. It is perhaps not coincidental that
just as the civil rights movements of the 1950s and early 1960s began
to crest, a renewed scholarly movement emerged calling for the
Republican Guarantee Clause to be made constitutionally relevant
again.15 The lower federal courts also began to draw on the Clause to
further federal efforts to enhance civil rights and ensure school
desegregation.16 Shortly thereafter, Congress drew on its constitutional
powers under the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

12. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring “the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution”).
13. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 79–88 (2012); David P.
Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 384 (2008). See generally infra Section
II.B (discussing the Republican Guarantee Clause in the Reconstruction era).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriation legislation.”); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”); id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). Although the precise semantic text
varies among each of the three enforcement clauses, they have long been treated as granting the
same kind of enforcement power to Congress.
15. Exemplary of this interpretive movement was Arthur Bonfield’s seminal 1961 law review
article, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, see
Bonfield, supra note 5, as well as William M. Wiecek’s 1972 book on the Clause, see WIECEK, supra
note 5, both of which reviewed a range of emerging assertations about the Clause’s meaning and
remain seminal works on the history of constitutional confrontations over the meaning of the
Clause.
16. See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
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Amendments to enact the Civil Rights Act of 196417 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).18 Legislation enacted under these
Reconstruction Amendments largely obviated the need for Congress to
contemplate taking action directly under the Clause and seemed to
assuage scholarly urgings for Congress to breathe new life into it.
The scope of the Congress’s power to regulate matters of political
participation in the states is again at the forefront of the national
constitutional dialogue. In a series of decisions over the past several
decades, the Supreme Court has come to increasingly second-guess
Congress’s determinations about the scope of its legislative enforcement
powers under the Reconstruction Amendments. In cases such as City of
Boerne v. Flores19 and Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v.
Garrett,20 the Court has rejected federal legislation as going beyond
Congress’s enforcement powers under those Amendments. And in
Shelby County v. Holder in 2013, the Court invalidated section 4(b) of
the VRA on the basis that Congress’s 2006 reenactment of the statute
was an impermissible exercise of Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment
Enforcement Clause power.21
In Shelby County, the Court for the first time second-guessed the
adequacy and sufficiency of the congressional findings necessary to
justify the legislative remedy it enacted under the VRA.22 As framed by
the dissent, the ultimate question the Court faced in Shelby County was
which branch of government should decide whether the VRA’s
preclearance coverage formula should remain operative: “[The] Court,
or a Congress charged with the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War
Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation’ ”?23 Questions about the
comparative institutional competence of the federal branches to ensure
fair political participation arose again in 2019 in Rucho v. Common
Cause.24 Prior to Rucho, the Court had repeatedly suggested that it
might yet provide relief for legal claims related to partisan
gerrymandering if it were presented with a “workable standard” for
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
18. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
19. 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded in part by statute, Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
20. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
21. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
22. In Shelby County, the Court found section (4)(b)’s coverage formula unconstitutional in
part because it was “based on decades-old data and eradicated practices” and was not “grounded
in current conditions,” “having no logical relation to the present day.” Id. at 551, 554.
23. Id. at 559 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2).
24. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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identifying and adjudicating such claims.25 A majority of the Court in
Rucho, however, shut the door to judicial remedies, concluding that
“partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the
reach of the federal courts.”26
Past constitutional conflicts concerning voting rights and access
to political participation have thus returned to prominence again today.
Since 2010, at least twenty-five states have taken actions whose effect
has been to restrict or narrow access to voting and participation in state
political processes that affect local, state, and federal elections.27 At the
same time, advances in computer technology and the development of
datasets with fine-grained voter information down to the individualvoter level have enabled state lawmakers and mapmakers to “put that
information to use with unprecedented efficiency and precision,”
making gerrymanders, as Justice Kagan explained in dissent in Rucho,
“far more effective and durable than before, insulating politicians
against all but the most titanic shifts in the political tides.”28
In the wake of Shelby County and Rucho, those concerned with
protecting voting rights and ensuring robust and fair political
participation have explored new actions the federal government could
take to oversee the states’ electoral apparatuses and guarantee fair
political participation for citizens in both state and federal elections.29
These efforts recently culminated in the U.S. House of Representatives
passing H.R. 1, the For the People Act of 2019, which seeks, through
federal legislation, to address a wide array of electoral problems among
the states.30 Because the states operate not only state and local elections
but also federal elections, unless the states develop entirely
independent systems to oversee their own non-federal elections, efforts
like H.R. 1’s, to remediate problems with federal elections, will also
alter the operation of state elections. Because some federal remedies
may reach beyond the regulation of only federal elections,
commentators have questioned whether Congress has the power to
enact such legislation under any of its Article I Commerce Clause and
25. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 270 (2004) (“That a workable standard for
measuring a gerrymander’s burden on representational rights has not yet emerged does not mean
that none will emerge in the future. The Court should adjudicate only what is in the case before
it.”).
26. 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07.
27. See
generally
New
Voting
Restrictions
in
America,
BRENNAN
CTR.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/new-voting-restrictions-america (last updated Nov. 19, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/3HEJ-6FZX] (identifying changes to state electoral laws since 2010).
28. 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
29. E.g., CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS DESTROYING
OUR DEMOCRACY (2018).
30. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).
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Elections Clause powers31 or its Reconstruction Amendment
enforcement clause powers.32 Others have called on Congress to
explicitly invoke the Republican Guarantee Clause as a source of power
to protect voting rights in the states.33 And most recently, the 2020
coronavirus pandemic has raised new and urgent questions about the
permissible role of Congress in ensuring safe and fair elections in the
states.34
Past legal and political precedents are thus instructive for
today’s constitutional controversies surrounding voting rights. Both the
mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century were marked by
heated national constitutional conflicts about the permissible scope of
Congress to intervene in state political processes, as well as the role of
the courts to review such federal intervention. The present moment is
thus an appropriate one to reexamine the Republican Guarantee
Clause’s role in historical constitutional confrontations about
enfranchisement and political participation among the political
branches, the courts, and the states. The Clause has played an often
overlooked but central role, and the Reconstruction-era congressional
interpretations of the Clause were important in paving the way for the
ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.35 Those
31. For the constitutional authority to engage in redistricting reform at the federal level, the
House cited to the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4. See H.R. 1, § 2400(b)(1) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4). The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides: “The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. While the Clause
provides Congress with the power to regulate elections for federal representatives, it is silent about
Congress’s power, if any, to regulate elections of state officers.
32. See, e.g., The Facts About H.R. 1—the For the People Act of 2019, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb.
1, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/the-facts-about-hr-1-the-the-peopleact-2019 [https://perma.cc/H8L2-E8AX] (arguing that H.R. 1 “federalizes and micromanages the
election process administered by the states, imposing unnecessary, unwise, and unconstitutional
mandates on the states”); Kate Ruane & Sonia Gill, Congress, Let’s Fix the Problems in H.R. 1 so
We Can Enact the Bill’s Much-Needed Reforms, ACLU (Mar. 5, 2019, 8:30 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/campaign-finance-reform/congress-lets-fix-problems-hr-1so-we-can-enact-bills-much [https://perma.cc/YNL8-RYUU]; Ilya Shapiro & Nathan Harvey, What
Left-Wing
Populism
Looks
Like,
NAT’L
REV.
(Mar.
7,
2019,
6:30
AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/03/democrats-for-the-people-act-unconstitutional-leftwing-populism/ [https://perma.cc/JP4B-HT4K].
33. E.g., Chin, supra note 5; Shapiro, supra note 7.
34. Compare Richard L. Hasen, How to Protect the 2020 Election from the Coronavirus, SLATE
(Mar. 13, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/2020-election-coronavirusbill-vote-by-mail.html [https://perma.cc/Q9ZC-VRTG] (advocating for federal legislation requiring
the states to offer no-excuse absentee balloting), with Hans A. von Spakovsky & J. Christian
Adams, Avenues to Voter Fraud Have No Place in Coronavirus Bill, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/commentary/avenues-voter-fraudhave-no-place-coronavirus-bill (arguing that proposed congressional responses would flout the
Constitution’s decentralized system of elections).
35. See infra notes 214–217 and accompanying text.
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congressional precedents bear significantly on how the Clause might be
interpreted in the future, but they have tended to be overlooked by the
lawyerly professional tendency to focus on the constitutional
interpretations of courts, not the political branches. Insofar as the
Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that the Clause’s application
raises political questions best left to the political branches, it is
somewhat surprising that these nineteenth-century congressional
interpretations have not been more central to modern understandings
of the Clause’s meaning. The constitutional histories of the Clause and
the Reconstruction Amendments are deeply linked. The ratification of
these Amendments fundamentally reconfigured the nature of the
relationships between the states and the federal government, as well as
the relationships between the citizens and their states.36 It is difficult
to see how the Clause’s meaning itself did not at least functionally
transform in the wake of their ratification.
Given that history, the Clause may well play an important role
in future confrontations between Congress and the Court over
Congress’s power under the Constitution. The best reading of the
Clause’s text, structure, and constitutional history suggests that the
Clause is directed primarily at the political branches, and especially at
Congress, and there are strong arguments that the Clause may provide
a basis for federal intervention in state election procedures to ensure
republican government. Situated against the Court’s recent
“juricentric”37 turn in second-guessing congressional actions under the
Commerce Clause and the Reconstruction Amendments, however, the
Court would be unlikely to permit Congress to take any and all actions
it might want under the Clause. The most pertinent issue, then, is
determining what actions Congress might reasonably take under the
Clause, and what the Court might do in response. Thus, this Article also
contributes to the literature by providing the first serious consideration
of the several distinctive approaches courts might take in reviewing
challenges to Congress’s Republican Guarantee Clause powers.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by situating the
Republican Guarantee Clause jurisprudence alongside the
jurisprudence of the Reconstruction Amendments, arguing that the

36. ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
REMADE THE CONSTITUTION xx (2019) (“Reconstruction amendments greatly enhanced the power
of the federal government, transferring much of the authority to define citizens’ rights from the
states to the nation.”).
37. Robert Post and Reva Siegel have described the Court’s approach in cases like Boerne and
Garrett as evincing a “juricentric constitutionalism,” a view of constitutional interpretation that
sees “the Constitution as a document that speaks only to courts.” Post & Siegel, Juricentric
Restrictions, supra note 11, at 2.
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meaning of the constitutional provisions can only be fully understood
together. Part II then demonstrates why this is so. The Republican
Guarantee Clause’s greatest period of constitutional significance was in
the decades leading up to the ratification of the Reconstruction
Amendments. The Clause played an essential role in the ratification of
these amendments and in the constitutionality of federal
Reconstruction more generally. Because the Clause served as the basis
for their ratification, there is a strong argument that inquiry into the
meaning of the Clause’s “republican government” guarantee cannot be
severed from the enactment history of those amendments.
That interpretation is in part supported by several
Reconstruction-era Supreme Court precedents that suggest that the
Court has implicitly rejected a second and competing meaning of “[t]he
United States.” That seemingly refuted meaning, explored in Part III,
is that the Clause affords the courts the capacity to guarantee to the
states that they are free from federal interference in their selfgovernance. Such an interpretation would instead situate courts as the
primary guarantors of the Clause, protecting the states from the federal
government. In addition to (a) this “negative guarantee” from federal
interference, this Part also briefly considers several other ways in which
the courts might serve as guarantors. These include (b) protecting the
state citizens and their elected representatives from antirepublican
actions taken by their state governments or from the delegation of
lawmaking authority to unelected bureaucrats, as well as (c) protecting
state citizens from deprivations by their state governments of
individual rights that are inherent to any republican form of
government. Recent litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit suggests that lower courts may be revisiting whether such
claims could be justiciable in limited circumstances.
The question, then, is whether legal claims arising under the
Clause would be justiciable today if Congress, rather than the courts,
were to act as the guarantor and in so doing attribute a particular
meaning to the Clause. Civil War–era legal precedents may provide a
ceiling above which courts may defer to the political branches in cases
of extreme exigency and emergency, but those precedents do not
necessarily provide a useful floor below which courts may reasonably
second-guess the constitutionality of the more ordinary actions
Congress takes in legislating.
Thus, Part IV of this Article explores the range of possible
actions Congress might take under this “sleeping giant”38 clause to
38. Jonathan K. Waldrop, Note, Rousing the Sleeping Giant? Federalism and the Guarantee
Clause, 15 J.L. POL. 267, 267 (1999).
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address problems at the sub-emergency level of republican governance,
in federal efforts to ensure republican governance and fair political
participation. Based on both judicial and congressional Reconstructionera precedents, this Article argues that the best understanding of the
Clause is one that grants Congress substantial authority to act, but that
also affords judicial review of challenges to such actions according to
the familiar “necessary and proper” standard of judicial review applied
to challenges to Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.
Whether congressional intervention in state electoral
apparatuses would be deemed “necessary and proper” would depend in
part on a congressional demonstration that appropriate measures could
not be feasibly undertaken by other governmental entities. Where a
state has shown a concerted resistance to addressing barriers to fair
political participation, or where the federal courts are unable (or
unwilling) to provide remedy such barriers, a federal legislative
response may be most warranted. In those circumstances, judicial
deference to Congress’s conclusion that federal intervention is
necessary may be more appropriate. The Supreme Court exhibited such
deference during Reconstruction after the Civil War,39 and it may well
be appropriate for it to do so again in the future. The Court’s recent
holding in Rucho that partisan gerrymandering claims are essentially
nonjusticiable in federal courts (including under the Clause) suggests
that Congress might have substantial latitude to intervene in state
electoral processes, at least in limited circumstances. This might occur
where Congress has concluded that these processes have been
instituted or implemented so as to deny fair participation or equal
representation to voters, or when it seems likely that such impediments
will handicap a majority of citizens from being able to remedy them at
the ballot box.
The increasingly political and high-profile nature of debates
about enfranchisement and access to political participation in the
states,40 coupled with the reduced scope of the Reconstruction
Amendments in the Court’s current jurisprudence, mean that it may be
only a matter of time before a historic constitutional confrontation
between the Court and the political branches emerges as to the role the
federal government may play in guaranteeing republican governance in
the twenty-first century.

39. See infra Section II.B.4.
40. E.g., Michael Wines, With 2020 Looming, Parties Fight State by State over Voting Access,
N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/us/voting-rights-states.html
[https://perma.cc/N6F8-VDMW].
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I. THE COURT AND CONGRESS AS CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETERS
Although easily overlooked today, the constitutional histories of
the Reconstruction Amendments and the Republican Guarantee Clause
are deeply intertwined, for they share three important characteristics.
The first is that both figured prominently in historical debates about
political participation, voting rights, and redefining the nature of
republican government in the United States. Indeed, until the
Reconstruction Amendments were enacted in the wake of the Civil War,
most constitutional claims that we associate with them today—and
especially claims about political enfranchisement—were largely
associated with the guarantee provided by the Republican Guarantee
Clause.
The second is the importance of each constitutional provision to
the others. I will argue that it is precisely because the Reconstruction
Amendments were enacted that the Republican Guarantee Clause
became the largely dormant constitutional provision it was for most of
the twentieth century. Both Congress and multiple presidents drew
directly on the Clause as a source of constitutional power to pursue
Reconstruction and help pave the way for the ratification of the
Reconstruction Amendments. In turn, those amendments—and the
federal legislation Congress enacted through them—contain more
specific and direct delegations of legislative power to enforce the
substantive rights guaranteed. In this way, each does important work
in establishing a newly redefined, post–Civil War baseline for the
minimally necessary aspects of a republican government.
The third commonality is that both the Republican Guarantee
Clause and the Reconstruction Amendments raise important questions
about the extent to which Congress may legislate to enforce their
constitutional guarantees. That question necessitates identifying which
branch has the authority to define the meaning of those guarantees.
Here, a contrast between the Republican Guarantee Clause and the
Reconstruction Amendments emerges: whereas justiciability concerns
have traditionally left courts at the sidelines of defining the meaning of
the republican guarantee, the Supreme Court has in recent decades
articulated an increasingly expansive role for courts in policing the
scope and nature of congressional actions to enforce and protect the
rights guaranteed by the Reconstruction Amendments.
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A. The Coequal Interpreters Account: The Republican Guarantee
Clause, the Political Question Doctrine, and
Legislative Constitutionalism
The conventional account of the Republican Guarantee Clause
is something like this: from 1849, when the Court first had occasion to
interpret the Clause in Luther v. Borden,41 up to the present day, the
Court has repeatedly disclaimed opportunities to give the Clause
meaning on the basis of the Clause’s nonjusticiability.42 Exemplary of
this understanding is the Court’s famous statement in Baker v. Carr
that claims arising under the Republican Guarantee Clause “involve
those elements which define a ‘political question,’ and for that reason
and no other, they are nonjusticiable.”43 Such nonjusticiable political
questions, the Court has repeatedly stated, are more appropriately
resolved by the political branches than the courts.44 The Court’s
reasoning has an intuitive appeal. Just what a republican form of
government is, and what it means to guarantee that form to a state,
would seem to be an inextricably political inquiry, one courts are not
well situated to resolve.45
If that account is correct, it suggests that the political branches
may sometimes be coequal interpreters of the Constitution, at least
insofar as they, rather than courts, have been tasked by the Clause with
deciding what constitutes a republican form of government as set out in
the Constitution. Robert Post and Reva Siegel have described such
activity as “legislative” or “policentric” constitutionalism—“the
distribution of constitutional interpretation in our legal system across
multiple institutions, many of which are political in character.”46 From
our contemporary vantage point, that notion appears at odds with the
well-accepted principle of judicial supremacy. Yet as critics of judicial
supremacy on both the left and the right have pointed out—among them
former Stanford Law School Dean Larry Kramer,47 former Reagan
41. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–43 (1849).
42. E.g., Zachary M. Vaughan, Note, The Reach of the Writ: Boumediene v. Bush and the
Political Question Doctrine, 99 GEO. L.J. 869, 872 (2011) (“The Luther Court’s declaration that the
[Republican] Guarantee Clause [raises] a nonjusticiable political question has been consistently
followed.”).
43. 369 U.S. 186, 218 (1962).
44. E.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (“This Court has several times
concluded . . . that the Guarantee Clause dos not provide the basis for a justiciable claim” (citing
Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1918)).
45. Baker, 369 U.S. at 222 (noting “the lack of criteria by which a court could determine which
form of government was republican”).
46. Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 11, at 2022–23.
47. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 228 (2004):
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Administration Attorney General Edwin Meese,48 and former Tenth
Circuit Judge Michael McConnell49—neither the Framers nor early
American jurists understood the Constitution as a document whose
meaning was to be developed and determined exclusively by the (thenlimited) federal courts. On a very technical level, such a clean division
of labor may be impossible: when Congress enacts legislation to fulfill
constitutional guarantees, or when the executive branch acts to enforce
such protections, the political branches necessarily make claims about
the Constitution’s meaning to establish the appropriate basis for
legislative or executive authority.50
Given these dynamics, even proponents of judicial supremacy
must acknowledge that the concept is often rife with internal tensions,
especially when situated alongside the political question doctrine.
Under the latter doctrine, since Marbury v. Madison51 the Court has on
occasion chosen to “abstain from resolving constitutional issues that are
better left to other departments of government.”52 Whereas judicial
supremacy stands for the peremptory role of courts, the political
question doctrine calls for their restraint.
This tension is central to understanding how the Court has dealt
with interpretive questions arising under not only the Republican
Guarantee Clause, but also the Reconstruction Amendments. Some,
such as Herbert Wechsler, have sought to reconcile the political
question doctrine with the concept of judicial supremacy by concluding
that the political question doctrine must have limited application only
Neither the Founding generation nor their children nor their children’s children, right
on down to our grandparents’ generation, were so passive about their role as republican
citizens. They would not have accepted—did not accept—being told that a lawyerly elite
had charge of the Constitution, and . . . [s]omething would have gone terribly wrong,
they believed, if an unelected judiciary were being given that kind of importance and
deference.
48. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985–86 (1987)
(“The Supreme Court, then, is not the only interpreter of the Constitution. Each of the three
coordinate branches of government created and empowered by the Constitution—the executive
and legislative no less than the judicial—has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the
performance of its official functions.”).
49. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 171 (1997) (“This idea of congressional interpretive authority
corresponds to the most straightforward reading of Marbury, in which judicial review is
justified . . . by the supremacy of the Constitution over other sources of law, and the duty of all
officials, not only judges, to enforce the Constitution.”).
50. See Edwin Meese III, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1003, 1005–06
(1987) (“Members of Congress, in voting on legislation, are bound by the oaths they take to act in
a constitutional manner. Similarly the president, in exercising his veto and in enforcing the laws,
is bound by his oath to respect the Constitution.”).
51. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52. Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457,
1458 (2005).
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in instances where the Constitution itself seems to call for judicial
deference.53 Rachel Barkow has described this approach as the
“classical” articulation of the political question doctrine, where “[t]he
Constitution [itself] carves out certain categories of issues that will be
resolved as a matter of total legislative or executive discretion.”54 On
this view, it is the Constitution itself that commands judicial
abstinence. For instance, many have concluded that the precise
definition of the constitutional term “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors”—for which the president and other civil officers of the
United States may be removed from office—is a determination for
Congress, rather than the courts, to make.55
Instances of classical political questions would seem to be most
amenable to the theories of “popular” or “legislative” constitutionalism
advanced by Kramer, Meese, and Post and Siegel, for within that
narrow band of constitutional questions reserved for the political
branches, Congress and the president, rather than the Court, would be
the Constitution’s peremptory interpreters. And if the Constitution
truly does reserve some questions of interpretation for the political
branches—however rare they may be—the political question doctrine
could be reconciled more easily with the theory of judicial supremacy.
The judiciary’s interpretive authority would remain unquestioned for
all interpretive constitutional issues but those few for which the
Constitution expressly allocates interpretive power to the political
branches.
An alternative understanding of the political question doctrine
is as a more pragmatic judicial approach. Emphasizing the passive
virtues of the Court, those such as Alexander Bickel have long argued
that the political question doctrine should arise not from a mandate
under the Constitution itself, but rather from an exercise of casespecific pragmatic judicial discretion.56 On this view, the political
question doctrine emerges from a coupling of both “guiding principle

53. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
7–8 (1959).
54. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 247–48 (2002).
55. E.g., Gary L. McDowell, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Recovering the Intentions of
the Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 626, 649 (1999) (“[T]he determination of whether presidential
misconduct rises to the level of ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors,’ as used by the Framers, is left to
the discretion and deliberation of the House of Representatives.”).
56. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961). Wechsler’s strict constructionist position, Bickel argued, is hard to
reconcile with the Court’s recurring decisions to decline jurisdiction in denials of certiorari or
dismissals of appeals for want of a substantial federal question. Id.
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and expedient compromise.”57 Barkow has described Bickel’s
articulation as the “prudential” form of the political question doctrine.58
This distinction between the classical and prudential political
questions is critical to understanding precisely what the Court has said
about the Republican Guarantee Clause in the past, and what it may
say in the future. For if the Clause raises classical political questions,
then it is because the Clause tasks the political branches with the
peremptory discretion to decide what constitutes a republican form of
government, and what actions those branches may take to guarantee
that form. This would present a genuine opportunity for legislative or
executive constitutionalism. By contrast, if the Court’s invocations of
the political question doctrine in cases concerning the Clause have been
of the prudential form, there is no reason to think that, under different
circumstances, the Court would remain disinclined to give the Clause
affirmative meaning.
But skepticism that the Clause raises a classical form of the
political question doctrine may be warranted, for the Court has in
recent years narrowed its application of the political question doctrine59
and shown an increasing appetite for second-guessing the political
branches’ understanding of the scope of their constitutional powers.60
Indeed, in light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence interpreting (and
narrowing) Congress’s capacity to act under the enforcement clauses of
the Reconstruction Amendments, there is good reason to doubt that the
Court would be inclined to remain entirely hands-off, as the next
Section suggests.

57. Id. at 49.
58. Barkow, supra note 54, at 253. According to Barkow, prudential political questions
implicate as many as five of the six factors identified by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr in his
account of the type of cases that warrant application of the political question doctrine. See id. at
265; see also 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
59. See, e.g., Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The
Political Question Doctrine as a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. POL. 427, 428 (2014) (noting that
the Court in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012), “once and for all rung the death knell for
the application of the ‘political question doctrine’ as a justiciability doctrine”).
60. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 86, 91 (2016) (noting “the
Roberts Court’s recent turn away from the political question doctrine and the Court’s juricentric
focus”).
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B. The Judicial Supremacy Account:
The Reconstruction Amendments and Juricentric Constitutionalism
The Reconstruction Amendments have had a “strange career.”61
Enacted into law by the “Radical” Republican Congresses of the late
1860s, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments have
been called a “second founding,” a “quantum leap . . . in nationalizing
the protection of individual rights against state abridgment,”62 and a
“ ‘constitutional revolution’ . . . that created a fundamentally new
[Constitution] with a new definition of both the status of blacks and the
rights of all Americans.”63 Though the Amendments promised
guarantees of equality in terms of both protection of individual rights
and access to political participation and representation, it took the
better part of a century after their ratification for the federal
government to provide meaningful protection under the amendments
and consolidate the temporary gains made during Reconstruction.
The Amendments’ slow start was the result of factors both
political and judicial. Politically, Congress’s appetite for supervising
southern state institutions directly, including the state electoral
processes used to select federal representatives, had waned by the early
1870s in the face of widespread resistance and violence by white
southerners and an economic depression that emerged in the north.64
This culminated after the 1876 presidential election with the HayesTilden compromise of 1877, which is largely understood as signaling the
end of federal Reconstruction efforts and ushering in federal
capitulation to the rise of the Jim Crow racial caste system in the
South.65
Equally significantly, during this same period the Supreme
Court cynically narrowed the meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments themselves, as well as the Reconstruction-era laws
enacted under them. In a series of cases in the 1870s and 1880s,66

61. Eric Foner, The Strange Career of the Reconstruction Amendments, 108 YALE L.J. 2003,
2003 (1999).
62. I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 82 (1991).
63. See FONER, supra note 36, at xx (quoting Republican leader Carl Schurz).
64. See id. at 143–44.
65. See, e.g., C.V. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE
END OF RECONSTRUCTION 3–14 (1951) (depicting the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1877 as bringing
the end of Reconstruction in the South).
66. See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT.
115, 133–40 (1994) (describing the legal and practical effects of various Supreme Court cases as
the “judicial codification” of “Jim Crow constitutionalism”).
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including the Slaughterhouse Cases,67 United States v. Reese,68 United
States v. Cruikshank,69 and the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,70 the Court
set in motion the constitutional capacity for the South to implement the
Jim Crow and the Black Codes by narrowing private rights claims and
federal judicial means of enforcement in the absence of federal
executive-branch intervention.
Historians, too, played an important social role in
deconstructing the validity of federal Reconstruction efforts in the
South. As African-American historian W.E.B. Du Bois noted in Black
Reconstruction in 1935, white historians had delegitimized not only
black contributions to Reconstruction, but also Reconstruction itself, by
“ascrib[ing] the faults and failures of Reconstruction to Negro ignorance
and corruption,” depicting Reconstruction as “a disgraceful attempt to
subject white people to ignorant Negro rule.”71 Historian Eric Foner has
documented how this account of Reconstruction “dominated historical
writing, legal scholarship, and popular consciousness” for most of the
twentieth century.72 The net effect was to maintain for nearly another
century the widespread racial inequality and voter disenfranchisement
the Reconstruction Congress had sought to extirpate through the
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments.
Between the lack of congressional efforts to enforce the
Amendments and nearly a century of judicial narrowing of their
meaning, it is perhaps not surprising that by the mid-twentieth
century, scholars began to search for other sources of constitutional
protection for equal rights, and they turned once again to the
Republican Guarantee Clause. In the years leading up to the civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s, scholars and activists argued anew
that the Clause directly addressed the rights of individual citizens, who
could derive from the Clause claims of constitutionally protected
individual rights vis-à-vis their insufficiently republican state
governments.

67. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (construing the “privileges and immunities” guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to those provided under federal rather than state law).
68. 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (invalidating a federal law enacted under the Fifteenth Amendment
that criminalized sanctions on local officials who denied citizens the right to vote).
69. 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding that private individuals could not be held liable for violating
the Fourteenth Amendment rights of other individuals).
70. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
71. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE PART
WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 18601880, at 636–37 (Transaction Publishers 2013) (1935).
72. FONER, supra note 36, at xxi–xxiv.
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This “activist view” of the Clause was said to be “dominant
among scholars and commentators” by the early 1960s.73 Exemplary of
this interpretive movement was William Crosskey, whose
“monumental” 1953 multivolume originalist examination of the
Constitution was called by some contemporaries “ ‘the most fertile
commentary’ on the Constitution since The Federalist papers.”74 In it,
Crosskey contended that the Clause was the “chief source” of
congressional authority over the states, particularly in matters related
to implementing and ensuring the right to vote.75 Another astute
scholar of that era cautioned that while “[a]t the present time there is
no particular movement under way to give the guarantee an effective
content,” it was easy to imagine possible events that would inspire such
a movement, with “a South recalcitrant over civil rights [being] one that
springs immediately to mind.”76 He warned that the Clause “is a
tremendous storehouse of power to reshape our federal system and only
the good sense of the American people would be strong enough to keep
it within bounds if it were once invoked.”77 Others were less cautious:
one argued that the Clause served as a broad source of individual rights
claims that should be justiciable by courts,78 and several suggested that
the Clause provided Congress with the power to ensure access to the
right to vote in the states.79
Courts, too, were beginning to heed the call of potential
guarantees that could be located in the Clause. Often overlooked by
contemporary scholars is the 1956 decision Hoxie School District No. 46
v. Brewer,80 in which a federal court enjoined a number of individuals

73. WIECEK, supra note 5, at 300.
74. Clinton Rossiter, Politics and the Constitution, 16 REV. POL. 237, 238 (1954) (reviewing
WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(1953)).
75. 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 74, at 522–24.
76. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government and the
Admission of New States, 11 J. POL. 578, 604 (1949).
77. Id.
78. See Bonfield, supra note 5, at 560 (“As previously noted, since 1912 the Court has
denominated all issues raised under the guarantee nonjusticiable. This position is erroneous and
should be modified. For in a proper case, no barriers, practical or otherwise, bar the judiciary from
assuming its proper burden of enforcing section 4.”)
79. Arthur Bonfield, writing shortly before the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1961,
advocated for Congress to “liberalize state voting requirements” under the Clause in ways similar
to those ultimately accomplished by the VRA just several years later. Id. at 567. In contrast to
Congress’s eventual passage and subsequent amendment of the VRA, which relied on its
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Bonfield argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment was an inadequate basis for the “fuller realization of our society’s
democratic goals.” Id. at 514. Wiecek similarly argued that the Clause provided Congress with the
authority to legislate proactively. See WIECEK, supra note 5, at 301.
80. 137 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff’d, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
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and organizations, including the Arkansas White Citizens Council and
“White America, Inc.,” from harassing school district officials seeking to
implement school desegregation in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.81 When the jurisdiction of the
federal courts was questioned by Defendants, the court in Brewer
concluded that Plaintiff school officials could invoke the Republican
Guarantee Clause insofar as it “was their sacred right to function their
offices, and to live as citizens under a government of laws and not of
men, [so] they logically appealed to the national courts for protection
under the federal law.”82 That decision was affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit, and the Clause’s potential was not lost on scholars like William
Wiecek, who noted that “[i]f the anti-integrationist actions of the
respondent individuals and organizations were not restrained, the
petitioners would be deprived of representative government in violation
of the guarantee clause.”83
Widespread federal resort to the Republican Guarantee Clause
ultimately proved unnecessary. When Congress enacted the sweeping
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it drew on
its enforcement clause powers under the Reconstruction Amendments
to prophylactically and affirmatively enforce the specific rights
guaranteed by those amendments. Such an undertaking was not
without controversy or opposition—which has continued to this day.
The states and localities regulated by these laws have repeatedly
challenged Congress’s authority to wield broad enforcement power,
arguing that Congress has impermissibly interpreted these
amendments in enacting legislation that has improperly altered the
substantive meaning of the underlying rights protected. Shortly after
the passage of the VRA, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach84 and
Katzenbach v. Morgan (known as Morgan),85 the Supreme Court heard
challenges to the scope of Congress’s enforcement clause powers to
enact the VRA under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Both
decisions are instructive for understanding the framework under which
the Warren-era courts assessed congressional claims about
constitutional meaning.
In both cases, the Court upheld Congress’s broad enforcement
actions under the VRA as “appropriate legislation” under the
enforcement clauses. In Katzenbach, the Court rejected South

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Brewer, 137 F. Supp. at 366–67.
WIECEK, supra note 5, at 298.
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
384 U.S. 641 (1966).

Louk_galleyed (Do Not Delete)

2020]

4/10/2020 2:39 PM

GUARANTEEING REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

695

Carolina’s assertion that Congress’s exercise of its Fifteenth
Amendment Enforcement Clause power to strike down state voting
statutes and procedures would serve to “rob the courts of their rightful
constitutional role.”86 Instead, the Court pointed to that section’s
explicit instruction to Congress as evidence that Congress, not the
courts, would be chiefly responsible for implementing assurances of the
rights created by the amendment.87 Drawing on Ex parte Virginia,88
which upheld congressional efforts to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments shortly after the end of the Civil War, Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the Court, drew on Chief Justice Marshall’s famous
account in McCulloch v. Maryland of Congress’s authority to act under
the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with its Commerce
Clause power.89
On that basis, the Chief Justice concluded that Congress could
do more than merely forbid direct violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment;90 instead, he affirmed Congress’s capacity to fashion
inventive and prescriptive remedies, recognizing the insufficiency of
case-by-case litigation to address the widespread problems of voting
discrimination within the relevant covered states and political
subdivisions.91 “As against the reserved powers of the States,” the Chief
Justice concluded, “Congress may use any rational means to effectuate
the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”92
The Court elaborated on this test a few months later in Morgan,
where Justice Brennan, this time writing for the unanimous Court,
similarly equated Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement
Clause power to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which authorized
“Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”93 The Court assessed the constitutionality of section 4(e)
of the VRA, which legislatively prohibited literacy tests for voter
eligibility that the Supreme Court had previously found to be
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Election, a case decided just seven years
86. 383 U.S. at 325.
87. Id. at 325–36.
88. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
89. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326–27 (“The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress
with relation to the reserved powers of the States.” (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819))).
90. Id. at 327.
91. Id. at 328.
92. Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
93. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
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prior to the VRA’s enactment.94 Applying the three-part Necessary-andProper-Clause analysis classically announced in McCulloch v.
Maryland, Justice Brennan concluded that section 4(e)’s prohibition
was (1) “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Amendment; (2) “plainly
adapted to that end”; and (3) in accord with “the letter and spirit of the
constitution.”95 This rational means test became a cornerstone of
constitutional litigation related to the VRA, and for several decades
thereafter, the Court continued to uphold Congressional enforcement
actions under the clauses.96 Thus, one might understand Morgan as
standing for a form of legislative constitutionalism whereby Congress
may act to further constitutional provisions beyond what the Court
understands the underlying provision to strictly prohibit or require.
Nevertheless, the Court’s seeming toleration for legislative
constitutionalism waned by the 1990s. In City of Boerne v. Flores,97
which concerned a challenge to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (“RFRA”),98 Congress passed legislation in direct response to the
Court’s perceived narrowing of the Free Exercise Clause’s potential
applications in Employment Division v. Smith.99 Congress had claimed
during RFRA’s passage that it was an appropriate exercise of its
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement authority insofar as
that amendment has been understood to incorporate most First
Amendment protections against the states.100 Nevertheless, the Court
94. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
95. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321
(1819)). For a helpful discussion of the Court’s internal debates while drafting these opinions, see
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers, and the Future of the Voting
Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99 (2007).
96. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1980) (invoking the
comparison to the Necessary and Proper Clause once more to uphold the Attorney General’s denial
of bailout to a city in a covered jurisdiction); United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 118–
23 (1978) (holding that preclearance requirements applied to political subdivisions of covered
jurisdictions even when these subdivisions are not responsible for registering voters); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128–29 (1970) (upholding amendments to the VRA enfranchising 18-yearolds in federal elections, abolishing literacy tests as prerequisites for voting, and abolishing state
durational residency requirements in presidential elections as within Congress’s power to enact).
97. See 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Congress’ discretion is not unlimited, however, and the
courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has
exceeded its authority under the Constitution.”), superseded in part by statute, Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
98. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012)).
99. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
100. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (stating that Congress had the authority to pass the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); S. REP. NO.
103-111, at 13–14 (1993) (noting that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is designed to
implement the Free Exercise Clause, which falls squarely within Congress’s Section 5 enforcement
power).
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invalidated RFRA’s application to the states, finding that “the design of
the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion
that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”101
Justice Kennedy, writing for a divided Court, curbed the extent
of Congress’s enforcement—and interpretive—powers by rearticulating
the Court’s holding in Morgan: “There is language in our opinion in
Katzenbach v. Morgan which could be interpreted as acknowledging a
power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights
contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a necessary
interpretation, however, or even the best one.”102 Justice Kennedy
disclaimed the idea that Congress could do anything but enforce the
substantive provisions of the Amendment, arguing that “[l]egislation
which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to
be enforcing the Clause.”103 He went on to issue a new standard for
determining whether Congress has acted in accordance with its
enforcement powers: “There must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end.”104
Boerne signaled the Court’s growing inclination toward what
Robert Post and Reva Siegel have labelled “juricentric”
constitutionalism,105 under which the Court has invalidated several
other federal laws as reaching beyond Congress’s enforcement clause
powers. In Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, a
divided Court articulated a more exacting standard by which Congress
must justify its proactive enforcement of the Reconstruction
Amendments.106 Writing for the five-member majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist elaborated that Boerne “confirmed . . . the long-settled
principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to
define the substance of constitutional guarantees.”107 Two years later,
in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court
commented further, noting that while Congress’s enforcement powers
include the ability to “enact so-called prophylactic legislation that
proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (emphasis added).
Id. at 527–28 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
See discussion supra note 37.
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
Id. at 365.
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unconstitutional conduct . . . it falls to this Court, not Congress, to
define the substance of constitutional guarantees.”108
More recently, the Court in Shelby County v. Holder disavowed
the constitutionality of Congress’s most recently enacted VRA
preclearance regime, seemingly calling into question whether the Court
would continue to apply its more deferential “any rational means”
standard of review for congressional enactments under the enforcement
clauses, as set out in Katzenbach and Morgan.109 Rather, the Court held
that the VRA’s section 4 preclearance regime—based on formulas
originally developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s and reenacted in
2006—had been an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Fifteenth
Amendment Enforcement Clause power.110 Writing for a five-member
majority, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that when reenacting the
VRA in 2006, Congress had not altered the decades-old formula for
determining which states and districts were covered by preclearance
requirements; instead, it had “reenacted” the same formula derived
from facts that were (by then) forty years old, “reverse-engineer[ing]”
the formula by first identifying covered jurisdictions and then
developing criteria to justify their inclusion.111 Concluding that
Congress had acted beyond its Enforcement Clause powers through
such an “irrational” approach,112 the Chief Justice employed a standard
similar to Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” test and held that
“Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy [a]
problem speaks to current conditions” of that problem rather than
outdated ones.113 Shelby County suggests that the contemporary Court
will preserve for itself not only the role of interpreting the
Constitution’s guarantees, as in Boerne, but also the role of determining
whether the prophylactic legislation Congress enacts is appropriately
tailored to protect those guarantees.
The Court’s decades-long juricentric turn against legislative
constitutionalism of the Reconstruction Amendments seems to be in at
least some tension with its Republican Guarantee Clause
jurisprudence. After all, in those cases the Court has repeatedly
108. 538 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2003).
109. As the dissent noted, while the majority in Shelby County did not “purport to alter settled
precedent” regarding the Katzenbach any rational means test, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S.
529, 569 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), the majority did not “even identify[ ] a standard of
review” for determining whether Congress’s means were rational, id. at 580, instead simply
concluding that continued reliance on the section 4 coverage formula was “irrational,” id. at 556
(majority opinion).
110. Id. at 557.
111. Id. at 551, 554.
112. Id. at 556.
113. Id. at 557.
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invoked the political question doctrine to defer to other branches on
interpretive questions about the meaning and potential applications of
the Clause. Perhaps seeing an opening from this disjuncture, several
scholars have called for Congress to reenact the VRA under the
Republican Guarantee Clause instead of the Reconstruction
Amendments, citing to the Court’s repeated declarations that claims
arising under the Clause raise nonjusticiable political questions.114 The
question, then, is whether the other branches may act under the Clause,
and if so, what they might do under it.
II. THE POLITICAL BRANCHES AS GUARANTORS OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT
[T]he power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty is
primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress.
—Texas v. White115
Although often overlooked today, Congress and the president
were seen as central to the interpretation and enforcement of the
Clause throughout the nineteenth century, far more so than were the
courts. This Part discusses the roles that both the president and
Congress played in interpreting, applying, and enforcing the Clause
during this period, particularly during the Civil War and
Reconstruction. Most notably, both the president and Congress drew on
the Clause to justify federal Reconstruction in the South, and Congress
also invoked the Clause as a basis for paving the way for ratification of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. This history—and the
judicial deference exhibited to the political branches when their actions
were challenged in court—suggests that the Clause may be directed
primarily at the political branches. It also suggests that, at a minimum,
the Reconstruction Amendments irreparably altered what the
Republican Guarantee Clause might mean, fundamentally redefining
the notion of a constitutionally republican form of government.
Nevertheless, this Part also shows why it is a mistake to understand
the Clause as raising classical political questions that make the Clause
fully nonjusticiable in court.

114. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 5, at 1577 (arguing that “judicial review of an amended Voting
Rights Act grounded in part on the Guarantee Clause . . . would dramatically simplify the Court’s
review of the Act’s constitutionality” because “the Court has recognized repeatedly that Guarantee
Clause claims are for Congress to the exclusion of the courts”).
115. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S.
476 (1885).
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A. Presidential Action to Guarantee Republican
Government in Rhode Island
From its earliest invocations, the Republican Guarantee Clause
has always been closely linked to questions of voting, enfranchisement,
and political participation. The Clause first emerged as an important
part of constitutional debates in the mid-nineteenth century, as some
states had continued colonial-era policies of limiting the franchise to the
propertied who owned freehold estates.116 This practice was known as
“freehold suffrage,”117 and because only free white males could legally
own freehold estates under most state laws, the franchise was
practically limited to a small fraction of the total population of the
colonial-era states.118
In the subsequent decades, significant immigration and rapid
population growth meant that by the early nineteenth century, freehold
suffrage would result in effective minority rule, so nearly every state
that had it underwent a constitutional convention to reform its suffrage
rules.119 By 1840, Rhode Island was one of only two states that retained
a structure closely resembling freehold suffrage.120 Rhode Island had
never adopted a new constitution, instead retaining the charter
established under the reign of Charles II in 1663, which included
freehold suffrage.121 Although the state’s General Assembly had the
power to amend the charter by statute, calls to extend the franchise
went unheeded, in part because apportionment in its lower house was
set by city rather than by population, effectively ensuring minority rule
by the landed gentry even among the already narrowly defined class of
eligible voters.122
These conditions spurred an insurgence among those opposed to
freehold suffrage.123 Discontented citizens convened in 1841 and held
their own constitutional convention open to all free white males,
electing their own government and officers in contravention of the

116. See Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 335, 339–40 (1989) (discussing the significant extent of disenfranchisment among the
propertyless in the American colonies).
117. See Jacob Katz Cogan, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in NineteenthCentury America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 476–78 (1997).
118. See id. at 477.
119. See id. at 477–78.
120. William M. Wiecek, “A Peculiar Conservatism” and the Dorr Rebellion: Constitutional
Clash in Jacksonian America, 22 AM. J.L. HIST. 237, 240 (1978).
121. See AMASA M. EATON, THOMAS WILSON DORR AND THE DORR WAR: A PAPER READ BY HON.
AMASA M. EATON 4–5 (1909).
122. Wiecek, supra note 120, at 241–42.
123. WIECEK, supra note 5, at 88.
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charter government.124 This revolutionary effort was led by Thomas
Dorr, a celebrated lawyer and former member of the Rhode Island
General Assembly.125 Dorr was elected governor at the people’s
constitutional convention, and the suffrage movement associated with
the cause came to be known as the Dorr Rebellion.126 Out of the
suffragists’ constitutional convention came a constitution submitted for
ratification to the people of Rhode Island. In response, the charter
government also held a constitutional convention to reapportion
representative districts across the state and submitted its constitution
as well. Ultimately, the people’s constitution was ratified and the
charter constitution was rejected.127
The Republican Guarantee Clause played an important role in
conveying constitutional legitimacy on the suffragists’ claims to popular
sovereignty.128 One of the rallying cries behind the convention was the
claim that an almost exclusively freehold suffrage coupled with the
malapportionment of electoral districts effectively rendered the
government “unrepublican.”129 Both sides turned to the federal
government to intervene and assist their cause, with the suffragists
invoking the Republican Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, as
the basis for federal assistance, and the charter government invoking
the Invasion and Domestic Violence Clauses of the same section.130 The
suffragists notified President Tyler that a people’s constitution had
been adopted by a majority of the people of the state and a government
had been duly organized under it, so the federal government should
recognize it as the official government of Rhode Island.131
With the suffragists’ constitution ratified and the charter
government’s rejected, there was now confusion as to the legitimate
source of popular sovereignty in Rhode Island, and Rhode Island
“careened on to crisis.”132 In response to the convention and subsequent
rebellion, the charter government declared martial law, seeking to force
the suffragists’ upstart governing body into dissolution, and some in the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 88–91.
EATON, supra note 121, at 2.
Wiecek, supra note 120, at 238.
WIECEK, supra note 5, at 91.
For an extensive discussion of the philosophical principles at stake in the rebellion, see
GEORGE M. DENNISON, DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL, 1831-1861 (1976), and EATON, supra
note 121.
129. WIECEK, supra note 5, at 90.
130. ELISHA R. POTTER, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF A
CONSTITUTION, AND EXTENSION OF SUFFRAGE IN RHODE ISLAND 10–11 (Boston, Thomas H. Webb
& Co. 1842).
131. H.R. REP. NO. 28-546, at 52 (1844).
132. WIECEK, supra note 5, at 95.
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charter government suspected the leaders of the rebellion to be
recruiting arms and militiamen from Massachusetts to enforce the
people’s constitution against the charter government.133
In responding to an appeal from the charter governor for the
President to intervene by force,134 President Tyler explained that while
the Invasion and Domestic Violence Clauses might trigger obligations
for the federal government to intervene under certain circumstances,135
such circumstances had not yet actually arisen, for there had been no
actual insurrection.136 He assured them, however, that were an armed
insurrection or invasion to occur, the federal government would rapidly
intervene.137 Moreover, President Tyler also seemed to disclaim the
authority to intervene with force on the basis of the Republican
Guarantee Clause, arguing that if he were to take sides in the conflict,
it would “make the President the armed arbitrator between the people
of the different states and their constituted authorities, and might lead
to a usurped power.”138 President Tyler nevertheless released a
statement supporting the charter government and moved federal troops
to Fort Adams in Newport, Rhode Island, which undermined the
legitimacy of the rebellion and, scholars have since concluded,
effectively ended the political will for a rebellion in Rhode Island.139
Although the struggle for control of Rhode Island was now over,
contestation over the meaning of the Republican Guarantee Clause
continued. At the behest of a minority faction of the Rhode Island
General Assembly sympathetic to the Rebellion, the U.S. House of
Representatives appointed a select committee to explore the president’s
potential to act under the Clause, as well as to assess President Tyler’s
actions in response to the rebellion.140 In the select committee’s report
133. See, e.g., Affidavit of Samuel Currey as to Proceedings and Arming of Suffragemen (Feb.
5, 1842), in H.R. REP. NO. 28-546, at 655–66.
134. Letter from Samuel W. King, Governor of R.I., to President Tyler (Apr. 4, 1842), in H.R.
REP. NO. 28-546, at 656–57.
135. Section 4 of Article IV reads in its entirety: “The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
136. Letter from President Tyler to Samuel W. King, Governor of R.I. (Apr. 11, 1842), in H.R.
REP. NO. 28-546, at 658–59.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 659.
139. Vile, supra note 9, at 671.
140. WIECEK, supra note 5, at 108–09. The select committee was comprised of five members of
the U.S. House of Representatives: three Democrats and two Whigs. See Journal of the Select
Committee on the Rhode Island Memorial, in H.R. REP. NO. 28-546, at 87; see also People Search,
HIST., ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/
People/Search/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (providing a search function that produces information,
including party affiliation, for U.S. representatives).
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summarizing its findings, the committee rejected the President’s
interpretation of the Clause as potentially permitting him to interpose
federal power in favor of the seated government seeking assistance
without also inquiring into whether that state government itself was
legitimate or usurpative—in essence, reading all three portions of
Article IV, Section 4 together.141
But the committee also considered what powers Congress might
be vested with under the Republican Guarantee Clause. It concluded
that the Clause vests Congress with the power of “supervision” over the
state constitutions, at least so far as the “ascertainment of their
republican character is concerned.”142 It also concluded that “when
those constitutions do not provide for a republican form of
government . . . it is the duty of Congress to set [them] aside, and to
recognise and enforce one[s] which possess[ ] this republican
character.”143 While Congress could not “prescribe to the people of a
State the details of their constitution,” the committee did define a
republican form of government as “one which exists in the consent of
the people, and over which they have control.”144 This relatively limited
understanding of the Clause’s conferral of power to Congress would
ultimately be revisited by Congress after the Civil War.
Congress and the president were not the only federal actors to
question their capacity to determine what the Clause meant and what
they could do as a guarantor of it—so did the Supreme Court, albeit
long after the Dorr crisis had abated. The case in which it was asked to
decide the meaning of the Clause, Luther v. Borden, concerned a legal
claim that radically undersold the potential significance of the case.145
The precise legal claim was trespass related to a search of Luther’s
home by the charter militia during martial law. Luther claimed that
the search and seizure was an illegal trespass, since the charter
government had not been the legitimate government in Rhode Island.
Thus, his tort claim rested on the illegitimacy of the charter
government’s imposition of martial law, in part as a violation of the
federal Constitution’s republican-government guarantee.146
Given the minor nature of the tort claim at issue and the
magnitude of what the Supreme Court was being asked to hold, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the Court ducked the issue. It declined to
render an answer as to the meaning of the Clause, concluding instead
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

H.R. REP. NO. 28-546, at 60.
Id. at 63.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
Id. at 18.
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that federal interference in the domestic concerns of a state was a power
delegated by the Constitution to the political branches, not the courts.147
Given the highly political and contentious nature of the confrontation
between the charter government’s and the rebel government’s claims to
sovereignty, it is little wonder the Supreme Court sought to avoid
rendering a verdict as to the rightful bearer of state sovereignty, and
with it, the legal power to act in a sovereign capacity.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Taney held that
“Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in
the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not.”148
Once the decision had been made by Congress to sit a state’s senators
and representatives, it “could not be questioned in a judicial
tribunal.”149 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Taney noted that while the
Rhode Island government’s imposition of martial law was temporary,
were a military government “established as the permanent government
of the State, [it] would not be a Republican government, and it would
be the duty of Congress to overthrow it.”150
Chief Justice Taney thus seemed to endorse the notion that the
Republican Guarantee Clause is addressed at least in part to the
political branches, and that they are not only permitted to act under the
Clause, but perhaps required to do so—at least in circumstances where
a state government has become insufficiently republican in form.
Nevertheless, short of permanent martial law, Chief Justice Taney said
nothing about what circumstances, if any, might occasion Congress
taking action under the Republican Guarantee Clause. He did not
clearly conclude that the judiciary could never render a verdict as to the
meaning of the Clause. He only concluded that it was inappropriate to
exercise the judicial power to second-guess a political determination
reserved for Congress—the recognition of a state government’s officers.
The dicta in Luther thus suggested that while only Congress can decide
whether a particular state government’s composition is sufficiently
republican to merit admission, it left unresolved the question of
whether the Court could review congressional determinations related
to subsequent developments in state law.151

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 42.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 42.
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B. Civil War–Era Congressional and Presidential Restoration—and
Redefinition—of the Republican Form of Government
That very question of Congress’s power to intervene in the states
under the Republican Guarantee Clause was tested during and in the
years after the Civil War, as Presidents Lincoln and Johnson and the
Republican-controlled Congress debated how to go about
reincorporating the Confederate states into the Union. In marked
contrast to the circumstances in Rhode Island during the Dorr
Rebellion, in which both sides in the conflict had eagerly sought federal
intervention on their behalf, the southern states resisted federal
Reconstruction policies tooth and nail. As a matter of formal law,
President Lincoln had freed American slaves in his Emancipation
Proclamation in 1863, and slavery itself had been formally outlawed as
an institution with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in late
1865. Yet by the end of 1865, just months after the Civil War had
technically ended, unrepentant southern state governments were
already seeking to resurrect a de facto system of formal inequality
through the implementation of Black Codes.152
In debates about how the federal government might
reincorporate the southern states into the Union while adequately
protecting the rights of newly freed African Americans, the Republican
Guarantee Clause played a central role. The Clause was an especially
important source of authority for congressional Republicans seeking a
constitutionally legitimate basis for achieving the aims of
Reconstruction. Indeed, it served as a basis for ensuring that the
southern states guaranteed the privileges and immunities of citizenship
to recently freed former slaves, including the right to vote and to
participate in the state political processes—at least as a matter of
formal law.153 The Clause provided the legal foundation for many of the
federal government’s actions taken at the behest of the Reconstruction
Congress between the end of the war and the early 1870s, including
helping to pave the way for ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.154

152. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1217 (1992); see also FONER, supra note 36, at 47–48, 65–66 (describing white southerners’
efforts—in the words of one Reconstruction-era governor of Alabama—to make clear that
“politically and socially, ours is a white man’s government”).
153. See Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Congressional Interpretations of the Guarantee of a Republican
Form of Government During Reconstruction, 15 J.S. HIST. 192 (1949) (recounting a range of
interpretations asserted by Republicans in Congress during the early years of Reconstruction).
154. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L.
REV. FORUM 109, 112 (2013).
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Congress’s efforts during this period show the important ways
that constitutional interpretation can evolve and develop outside of the
courts, as the Reconstruction Congress sought the constitutional power
to oversee internal affairs within the former Confederate states.155
Initially, Republicans in Congress had considered founding the
constitutional basis for Reconstruction on Congress’s plenary powers
over U.S. territories; if the seceded states were treated as territories
prior to their formal readmission, that would put them directly under
Congress’s control.156 This approach not only seemed too drastic as a
matter of theory, but became increasingly unnecessary as a matter of
policy, for Union military governments were already operating in
several of the conquered Confederate states by the middle of 1862.157
The concept of acting to guarantee formation of truly republican
governments in the Confederate states soon replaced the
territorialization framework as the predominant theory of
Reconstruction.158 The Clause had been invoked in Congress as early as
1862, when Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts argued that
Congress could assume complete jurisdiction over the Confederate
states to “proceed to establish therein republican forms of government
under the Constitution.”159 Days later, Senator Ira Harris of New York
introduced a bill that would organize provisional governments in the
southern states in part on the basis of the Clause,160 though at that stillearly stage in the war, the bill never reached a vote.161 Harris’s bill,
taking a modified form of Chief Justice Taney’s articulation of the
Clause’s meaning in Luther, proposed an alternative to the
territorialization approach. It framed the southern states, in declaring
their intent to rebel from the Union, as having ceased to have a
republican form of government, and so the Clause would grant the
federal government not just the power but the duty to reestablish such
governments in republican form as a condition for the states’ return to
full standing in the Union.162 Such an approach would not only grant
Congress the power to enact its Reconstruction agenda, but could
theoretically be a sustained source of authority to supervise the states
155. See Lerche Jr., supra note 153, at 194–95.
156. See generally HERMAN BELZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION: THEORY AND POLICY DURING
THE CIVIL WAR 67–84 (1969) (describing congressional efforts to territorialize the Confederate
states in order to justify federal reconstruction efforts).
157. See id. at 84.
158. Id. at 122.
159. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 737 (1862).
160. Id. at 815.
161. See Lerche Jr., supra note 153, at 195.
162. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3141 (1862); see also Michael Les Benedict, Preserving
the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65, 74 (1974).
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even after they were readmitted, to ensure they would not go back on
their promises.163 In this way, the supervision of the state governments
was akin to the conditions imposed on territories seeking statehood
admission to the Union.164
Initially, even the Radical Republicans in Congress expressed
limited support for this approach to Reconstruction. As the extent of
southern resistance became clear, however, support for drawing on the
Clause as a source of federal power grew among Republicans in
Congress. Harris introduced a revised version of his bill in 1863, which
expressly drew on the Clause and was called “A Bill to guarantee in
certain States a republican form of government.” It presaged what was
to come, proposing that Congress could require the states to call new
constitutional conventions that would establish in those states a
republican form of government, and which would necessarily prohibit
slavery.165
As the Union government began to seize control of important
southern cities by 1864, Congress initiated efforts to pass a series of
bills setting out the basis for federal intervention in the southern states,
and a number drew directly on the Clause. Both houses of Congress
passed the first of these Reconstruction acts, called the Wade-Davis Bill
of 1864, a full year before the Union government had completely
prevailed over the Confederacy; the bill “guarant[eed] to certain States
whose governments have been usurped or overthrown, a republican
form of government.”166 Cosponsor Henry Davis provided one of the
more thorough interpretations of the Clause and argued that it gave
Congress wide latitude to fulfill the guarantee. Davis argued that the
Clause “vests [in] the Congress of the United States a plenary, supreme,
unlimited political jurisdiction, paramount over courts, subject only to
the judgment of the people of the United States, embracing within its
scope every legislative measure necessary and proper to make it
effectual.”167 Davis likened the plenary power provided to Congress
under the Clause to Congress’s plenary power to admit new states into
the union or to make rules and regulations for U.S. territories.168 He
went on to argue that the “duty of guarantying carries with it the right

163. Benedict, supra note 162, at 75.
164. See Amar, supra note 154, at 113 (“Western territories seeking statehood had been
required to establish their republican bona fides before they would be admitted to the Union as
proper republican states in good standing.”).
165. See BELZ, supra note 156, at 124.
166. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3448 (1864).
167. Id. at app. at 82 (speech of Hon. H. Winter Davis).
168. Id. Davis also seemed to draw on the Court’s dicta in Luther in arguing that all of Article
IV, Section 4 raised political questions inappropriate for review by the Courts. See id.
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to pass all laws necessary and proper to guaranty” and “the duty to
accomplish the result” such that “everything inconsistent with the
permanent continuance of republican government shall be weeded
out.”169
The Wade-Davis Bill was far-reaching in its intervention into
the governing affairs of the Confederate states. The bill would establish
provisional governments controlled by presidentially appointed acting
governors, set out qualifications for voting that would exclude highranking Confederate officials from running for statewide office, and
require that any state’s constitutional convention include a permanent
prohibition on involuntary servitude as a condition of constitutional
ratification.170 Davis grounded the constitutionality of such significant
federal interventions in the Clause; he argued that “[i]t places in the
hands of Congress the right to say what is and what is not, with all the
light of experience and all the lessons of the past, inconsistent, in its
judgment, with the permanent continuance of republican
government.”171 Davis further contended that “there [was] no power,
judicial or executive, in the United States, that can even question this
judgment but the PEOPLE; and they can do it only by sending other
Representatives here to undo our work.”172 Others echoed Davis’s view,
arguing that Congress’s Article I powers to judge the elections and
qualifications of its own members should be “understood in relation to
a more important power of Congress to guarantee republican
governments.”173 On this line of thinking, those Article I powers
“assumed a broader significance” due to their connection to the Clause
and extended beyond the “merely[ ] technical aspects of the elections of
representatives.”174
1. Presidential Invocations During and After the War
Given Davis’s sweeping view of Congress’s powers under the
Clause, it is remarkable that his bill was seen to occupy a “middle
ground constitutionally” between those who opposed Reconstruction
altogether and those who sought to treat the Confederate states as
territories to be placed entirely in Congress’s control.175 President
Lincoln initially opposed expansive congressional efforts at
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at app. at 83.
Id. at 3448–49.
Id. at app. at 83.
Id.
See BELZ, supra note 156, at 207.
Id.
Id. at 206.
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Reconstruction.176 His successor, Andrew Johnson, was even more
opposed to the Reconstruction Congress’s interventionist agenda.177 Yet
neither president disclaimed the power of the federal government to act
under the Clause, and both actively sought to preserve a role for the
executive branch to engage in Reconstruction activities under the
Clause. While President Lincoln declined to sign the Wade-Davis Bill,
his reasons for doing so were not because he disagreed with Congress’s
interpretation of the Clause. Rather, he explained that he was not
prepared “by a formal approval of this bill, to be inflexibly committed to
any single plan of restoration.”178 In other words, President Lincoln
sought to preserve the widest available scope in which the executive
could act, but he did not reject Congress’s assertion that he could draw
on the republican guarantee as the basis for intervention.179
Indeed, both during and after the Civil War, first Lincoln and
then Johnson—and the provisional governors under their command—
repeatedly cited the Clause as a source of constitutional executive
power authorizing their Reconstruction agendas.180 Military successes
by the middle of 1863 had presented Lincoln with the opportunity to
attempt the reorganization of loyal governments in Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Tennessee, in part on a theory that President Lincoln
had to “meet the war as he found it” while Congress was in recess
between March and December of 1863.181 These initial efforts—which
relied on loyal Unionists in the South taking the initiative in
reorganization—quickly stalled, and by December President Lincoln
sought to take matters into his own hands.182 In his December 1863
Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, Lincoln proclaimed that
only when Union-loyal southerners “reestablish[ed] a state government
which shall be republican” would those governments be recognized as
the true government of the state and receive the constitutional benefits
guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4.183 Notably, President Lincoln
176. See id. at 300 (describing Lincoln’s position that reconstruction was “fundamentally an
executive function”).
177. See FONER, supra note 36, at 55 (describing the “bitter split over Reconstruction policy
[that] developed between President Andrew Johnson and the Republican majority in Congress”
and the “evidence . . . of violent outrages against the freed people and the unwillingness of the
governments Johnson had established in the South to deal justly with the former slave”).
178. Proclamation No. 18 (July 8, 1864), reprinted in 13 Stat. 744, 744 (1864).
179. Id., 13 Stat. at 744–45
180. See OFFICE OF JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., U.S. ARMY, WAR DEPARTMENT NO. 64, THE USE OF
THE ARMY IN THE AID OF THE CIVIL POWER 7 (1898) (citing the use of the Clause to allow for the
use of military force to preserve the peace, uphold guaranteed rights, and prevent voter
intimidation).
181. See BELZ, supra note 156, at 126–28.
182. See id. at 150–56.
183. Proclamation No. 11 (Dec. 8, 1863), reprinted in 13 Stat. 737, 737–38 (1863).
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reserved the right for the federal government to make “modifications”
to “the subdivisions, the constitution, and the general code of laws” of
the southern states as necessary to fulfill his promise of
emancipation,184 foreshadowing the much more extensive congressional
Reconstruction plan that would unfold after his assassination.
President Johnson, too, repeatedly invoked the broad executive
powers provided by the Clause in the months after the Civil War ended.
He expressly cited the Republican Guarantee Clause in every one of his
presidential proclamations setting out the provisional governments for
each of the vanquished southern states. The first of these
proclamations, concerning the reentry of North Carolina, exemplified
the way the President would draw on the powers provided by the Clause
in every subsequent proclamation. Johnson concluded that “it [had]
become[ ] necessary and proper to carry out and enforce the obligations
of the United States to the people of North Carolina, in securing them
in the enjoyment of a republican form of government” and to “present
such a republican form of state government as will entitle the state to
the guarantee of the United States therefor.”185
Under the terms of each proclamation, President Johnson would
appoint a provisional governor to “prescribe such rules and regulations
as may be necessary and proper for convening a convention” of “the
people of said state who are loyal to the United States” to ensure a
republican form of state government as provided for under the
Clause.186 While the Invasion and Domestic Violence Clauses of Article
IV, Section 4 may have provided more straightforward bases for
intervention, Johnson cited the Republican Guarantee Clause as the
constitutional grounds for directly regulating state elections and
overseeing the reconstitution of the southern states’ constitutions so as
to ensure the rights of newly emancipated male African-American
citizens. If anything, what is striking about the constitutionalism of the
Republican Guarantee Clause during this period is that Congress and
the president did not disagree about the scope of the power conferred
by the Clause, but instead were engaged in a “bitter battle” over which
branch would serve as the primary guarantor of republican government
in the defeated southern states.187

184. Id., 13 Stat. at 738.
185. Proclamation No. 38 (May 29, 1865), reprinted in 13 Stat. 760, 760–61 (1865) (emphasis
added). Johnson invoked the Clause in every one of these presidential proclamations setting out
the provisional governments of each of the southern states. Others included Nos. 39 (Mississippi),
41 (Georgia), 42 (Texas), 43 (Alabama), and 47 (Florida).
186. E.g. Proclamation No. 38 (May 29, 1865), reprinted in 13 Stat. 760, 760–61 (1865).
187. See Lerche Jr., supra note 153, at 196–97.
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2. Congressional Reconstruction of Republican Forms of Government
The Clause not only played a notable role for the presidency, but
it was also central to the constitutionality of Congress’s Reconstruction
actions in the southern states as well as in the ratification process of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Republican-controlled
Congress had been uncertain of the precise legal criteria for assessing
the readmission of the southern states, but they were committed to
ensuring, at a minimum, the end of slavery and the guarantee of rights
for newly emancipated African Americans in the southern states,
including the right to vote and to participate in the state political
processes. Because many Republicans in Congress sought to avoid
permanent direct federal supervision of the southern states, however,
they instead sought a constitutional basis to condition the readmission
of the southern states to the Union on the permanent abolition of
slavery and the guarantee of political rights for newly freed African
Americans.188 The theory, which would ultimately prove to be far too
rosy, was that once the southern states were readmitted on these terms,
they would have no choice but to guarantee these rights to their
citizens, both black and white.
The Reconstruction Acts of 1867 accomplished this in a
somewhat heavy-handed fashion.189 The First Reconstruction Act of
1867—passed by a supermajority of Congress over President Johnson’s
veto190—forcefully invoked the Clause as a basis for its
constitutionality, premising federal intervention on the “necess[ity]
that peace and good order should be enforced in said States until loyal
and republican State governments can be legally established.”191 The
First Reconstruction Act recognized the absence of legitimate
governance in the southern states and so authorized the President to
subdivide them into five military districts under the control of
appointed officers of the army.192 Chief among the aims of the Act was
to assign district officers “to protect all persons in their rights of person
and property” and to oversee state constitutional conventions, which
would ensure the enactment of constitutions that would “provide that
the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as have the
188. See Benedict, supra note 162, at 74.
189. See Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 50–52 (1867) (discussing the details of the
First and Second Reconstruction Acts).
190. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 729–32 (1867) (Veto Message of President Andrew
Johnson, March. 2, 1867).
191. An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel State, ch. 153, pmbl., 14
Stat. 428, 428 (1867). For simplicity’s sake, this Article refers to this statute as the “First
Reconstruction Act.”
192. § 1, 14 Stat. at 428.

Louk_galleyed (Do Not Delete)

712

4/10/2020 2:39 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3:673

qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates.”193 As set out by
the Act, such persons were to expressly include “the male citizens of
said State, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or
previous condition.”194 The Act provided for a similarly wide franchise
for all elections (including state and local) in the provisional southern
governments,195 actions that are difficult to justify under Congress’s
Article I, Section 4 Elections Clause powers alone.196
In the spring of 1867, Congress passed the Second
Reconstruction Act, also over President Johnson’s veto,197 picking up
where the First Reconstruction Act left off. The Act set forth additional
requirements related to the states’ guarantee of their citizens’ voting
rights as a precondition for readmission. These included guaranteeing
the privileges and immunities of citizenship for the former slaves, as
well as the voting rights of all former confederates, provided they took
an oath of loyalty to the Union.198 The Second Reconstruction Act also
established federally operated boards of registration to ensure that
state officials did not thwart voter registration in the states and to
directly oversee all relevant aspects of state and local as well as federal
elections.199 Finally, the Third Reconstruction Act, which followed later
that summer, provided the military commanders with the power to
suspend or remove from state office any disloyal person, and provided
the boards of registration with broader powers to supervise federal
elections as well as state and local elections.200
During this period, the Reconstruction Congress also drew on
the Clause as a way of redefining the meaning of “republican
government” as set out in the Constitution. Whatever the term
“republican government” may have conveyed at the founding, the
Reconstruction Congress forcefully repudiated the notion that a
republican government could tolerate widespread disenfranchisement

193. §§ 3, 5, 14 Stat. at 428–29.
194. § 5, 14 Stat. at 429.
195. § 6, 14 Stat. at 429.
196. As noted above, federal congressional intervention in the states’ operations of their own
state and local elections is not easily justified under the Elections Clause, and so justifying such
sweeping federal conduct on the basis of the Republican Guarantee Clause is of some constitutional
significance. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
197. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 313–14 (1867) (Veto Message of President Andrew
Johnson, March 23, 1867).
198. Second Reconstruction Act, ch. 6, § 1, 15 Stat. 2, 2 (1867). See generally Georgia v.
Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 52 (1867) (stating that the reorganized government of Georgia was to be “in
the possession and enjoyment of all the rights and privileges . . . belonging to a State in the Union
under the Constitution”).
199. Second Reconstruction Act, ch. 6, § 6, 15 Stat. at 3.
200. Third Reconstruction Act, ch. 30, §§ 2–3, 5, 15 Stat. 14, 14–15 (1867).
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and inequality—at least on the basis of race.201 Congress invoked the
Clause as a basis for ensuring the southern states’ integration of
African Americans into state political processes. In 1867, for example,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution instructing the House
Judiciary Committee to investigate “whether the States of Kentucky,
Maryland, and Delaware now have State governments republican in
form.”202 This was an especially striking action because although each
of these border states had permitted slavery leading up to the Civil War,
none had been a member of the Confederacy, and so the basis for such
inquiries could not be justified on questions of readmission alone.
Over time, Congress recognized that conditional readmission
alone would not be sufficient, so the Reconstruction-era Congresses also
sought to provide individual rights guarantees and direct private rights
of action to vindicate those guarantees. Members of Congress explored
enacting legislation under the Clause that would provide a direct
federal guarantee of universal male suffrage, anticipating rights later
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment (which concretely
established the citizenship of all African Americans born in the United
States) and Fifteenth Amendment (which prohibited the denial of the
right to vote on the basis of race). Several bills were introduced in
Congress to guarantee universal male suffrage among citizens of the
states, and the bills located congressional power to enact such
legislation in the Clause.203
One problem with this approach was that while Congress rested
its constitutional authority for these bills on the Republican Guarantee
Clause, concerns grew that federal laws protecting individual rights in
state electoral procedures could be foiled simply by a change in party
control of Congress. Moreover, a number of representatives questioned
whether Congress could rest such extensive legislative power under the
Clause, given founding-era precedents. Elisha R. Potter, a
representative from Rhode Island and future justice of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, argued that one of the strongest arguments against
Congress’s power to enforce the Clause against the states rested on the
same original constitutional practices interpretation that opponents of
the Dorr Rebellion had used several decades prior: that at the country’s

201. Nevertheless, the Reconstruction Congress also introduced a gendered distinction into
the Constitution for the first time, as Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment limited certain
punitive measures for denying the right to vote only to “male citizens.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 2. Although female suffragists had lobbied heavily for either gender-neutral language around
voting or else an equal guarantee for women, they were denied both when Congress drafted the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See FONER, supra note 36, at 112–15.
202. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 656–57 (1867).
203. Benedict, supra note 162, at 75 & n.24.

Louk_galleyed (Do Not Delete)

714

4/10/2020 2:39 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3:673

founding, nearly every state permitted slavery, and yet each state had
apparently been considered sufficiently republican in form so as to be
admitted into the Union.204 Unless it was admitted that nearly every
state had been in violation of the Clause—including nearly all of the
northern, Republican-controlled states—it was difficult to make the
case that the republican guarantee included the guarantee of
emancipation for all citizens.
Senator Sumner, sponsor of several of the Reconstruction Acts
that imposed conditions on the southern states’ political structures in
exchange for readmission to the Union, countered that whether or not
the guarantee promised by the Clause had been perfectly enforced, it
had always been there: “Before the extinction of Slavery, State Rights
were successful against this guarantee.”205 Senator Sumner portrayed
southern states as having “played the turtle, drawing head, legs, and
tail all within an impenetrable shell.”206 Rather, the “mighty power” of
the Clause had been “[a]sleep” while slavery prevailed; henceforth,
Congress’s duty to guarantee a republican government under the
Clause would be “constant and ever-present,” “reënforced by all needful
powers” and “executed at all hazards.”207 He argued that allowing the
post-Reconstruction southern states to continue in the same course
would “dishonor the Constitution and . . . abandon the crowning victory
over the Rebellion.”208 In this sense, Senator Sumner’s argument
parallels the constitutional history of congressional legislation enacted
under the Reconstruction Amendments: it took nearly a century after
those Amendments were ratified before Congress sought to
meaningfully enforce their promises through remedial legislation in the
forms of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Despite the broad claims of congressional power that some
members of Congress such as Senator Sumner sought to derive from
the Clause, in the end, congressional Republicans would only rely on
the Clause as a “vague guide in setting the conditions that southern
states had to meet before Congress would recognize them as entitled to
normal state rights.”209 Part of the problem was just as the Court in
Luther had concluded: settling on a precise definition of republicanism
was a difficult political question—not just for the courts, but for
Congress also. Congressional Republicans struggled to articulate a
204. See POTTER, supra note 130, at 39–40.
205. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2423 (1870) (debating readmission of the State of
Georgia).
206. Id. (emphasis omitted).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Benedict, supra note 162, at 75.
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workable definition to guide federal intervention in a way that could be
usefully applied on the ground. For example, during Senate debates
over the conditions for readmission of the State of Mississippi to the
Union, Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont recognized that “we
might change either one of these [proposed] provisions in the
constitution of Mississippi, and the constitution would be republican
still.”210 Certainly, Congress unquestionably had the broad power to
interfere and restore republican institutions to any state which “fail[ed]
within the fair spirit of the Constitution to maintain republican
government within its borders.”211 But to Senator Edmunds, the Clause
seemed an underspecified basis for more specific action given the other
tools in Congress’s constitutional arsenal.
This was because, in addition to serving as a free-standing basis
for legislative action, the Clause could also be understood to work in
tandem with Congress’s Article I powers. Alongside the broad
Reconstruction supervisory powers Congress had invoked on the basis
of the Republican Guarantee Clause, Congress also drew on other
constitutional powers to enforce Reconstruction conditions on the
southern states. For example, under its Article I, Section 5 power to
judge the qualifications of its members, the Reconstruction Congress
repeatedly refused to seat southern Democrats elected to serve as
representatives in the House when Congress was of the view that the
elections through which they had been selected had been conducted
under circumstances that failed to meet the minimal republican
government requirements of the Reconstruction Acts.212
3. Guaranteeing Ratification of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
The decline in congressional efforts to directly legislate under
the Republican Guarantee Clause can also be traced to the rising
momentum for enshrining specific republican guarantees directly in the
Constitution. In this effort, the Clause also served as a chief basis for
the process that would ensure the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In addition to mandating reforms of the southern state
constitutions and guaranteeing the political rights of African
Americans, the First Reconstruction Act of 1867 also required the
southern states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as a precondition
210. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1333 (1870).
211. Id.
212. E.g., Morton Stavis, A Century of Struggle for Black Enfranchisement in Mississippi:
From the Civil War to the Congressional Challenge of 1965 - And Beyond, 57 MISS. L.J. 591, 593–
95 & 593–94 nn.8–9 (1987).
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for readmission.213 And because Congress had predicated its power to
enact the First Reconstruction Act on the Republican Guarantee
Clause, the Clause can very much be understood to be the basis upon
which the Fourteenth Amendment itself was assured of coming into
being.214
Akhil Amar has been perhaps the most forceful advocate for this
understanding of the constitutional power granted to Congress under
the Clause.215 Amar has argued that “the Reconstruction Act’s
additional directive that former Confederate states ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment was also an appropriate instrument to further
the republican-government ideal” because the Amendment’s
requirements in incorporating many of the Bill of Rights protections—
among them, that every state guarantee equal citizenship, free speech,
free assembly, free religious exercise, and fair trials—were concrete
elements of a “proper republican government.”216 In this sense,
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment can be said to have
substantively altered the meaning of “republican government” as
guaranteed by the Republican Guarantee Clause, because the
Amendment set a new baseline for equality below which no state
government may descend. Whereas prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment a state government could be republican in form without
guaranteeing the rights and protections enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
incorporation of those rights in the Amendment fundamentally
reconfigured the permissible floor concerning what might constitute a
republican form of state government.
Amar has also noted that the ratification requirement was not
formally necessary to ensure the Amendment’s entry into the
Constitution, for three-quarters of the Union states had already ratified

213. An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel State, ch. 153, § 5, 14
Stat. 428, 429 (1867):
[W]hen said State, by a vote of its legislature elected under said constitution, shall have
adopted the amendment to the Constitution of the United States, proposed by the
Thirty-ninth Congress, and known as article fourteen, and when such article shall have
become a part of the Constitution of the United States, said State shall be declared
entitled to representation in Congress, and senators and representatives shall be
admitted therefrom . . . .;
see also An Act to Admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida, to Representation in Congress, ch. 70, § 1, 15 Stat. 73, 73 (1868) (“[T]he
constitutions of neither of said States shall ever be so amended or changed as to deprive any
citizen . . . of the right to vote in said States.”); An Act to Admit the State of Arkansas to
Representation in Congress, ch. 69, § 1, 15 Stat. 72, 72 (1868) (“[T]he constitution of Arkansas
shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen . . . of the right to vote.”).
214. Amar, supra note 154, at 111–12.
215. See AMAR, supra note 13, at 84–88.
216. Id. at 86–87.
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the Amendment by early 1867, well before Congress required the
southern states to ratify it as a condition of readmission under the First
Reconstruction Act.217 Instead, the link between the Clause, the First
Reconstruction Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment helps to reveal
how Congress sought to transmute the vague power of the Clause into
the more specific federal powers granted by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment’s origins can be thus traced
in meaningful part to Congress’s exercise of power under the Clause,
and it suggests these constitutional provisions must be read and
understood together. (This also suggests, as I will discuss further in
Part III, that the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments must
be factored into any analysis of the Clause’s meaning that can be
derived from founding-era “original meaning” sources.)
Similar congressional legislation helped to ensure the
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment two years later among those
recalcitrant southern states that had refused to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment as a precondition for readmission.218 In contrast to the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Fifteenth did rely on its
ratification among the southern states seeking readmission, for several
western states (fearing the future enfranchisement of Chinese
residents), northern states (fearing enfranchisement of the Irish), and
Union border states (Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware) refused to
immediately ratify it upon its passage.219 Because the Republican
Guarantee Clause served as a basis for the ratification of both
amendments among the southern states, the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments can in one sense be understood as a more
specific and detailed manifestation of the broader legislative guarantee
Congress sought to provide under the Republican Guarantee Clause.
And what is especially striking about this period is that while the
Supreme Court has never given an affirmative meaning to the Clause,
it has tacitly endorsed Congress’s actions during Reconstruction—even
if the Court would largely go on to narrow and enervate the legislative

217. Id. at 87.
218. See An Act to Admit the State of Texas to Representation in the Congress of the United
States, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80 (1870) (noting that adoption of a state constitution establishing a
republican government and ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were
preconditions to receiving representation in Congress); An Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to
Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67 (1870) (same); An Act to
Admit the State of Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 10, 16 Stat.
62 (1870) (same); see also FONER, supra note 36, at 107–08 (describing the ratification process of
the Fifteenth Amendment among the southern states seeking readmission through
Reconstruction).
219. See FONER, supra note 36, at 108.
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and constitutional byproducts of Reconstruction in the latter half of the
nineteenth century.
4. Judicial Deference to Republican Reconstruction
Radical Republicans were not the only ones who sought to draw
on the Clause to support their political positions: the Republicans’
reconstruction plans were challenged under the Clause by the southern
states, which went to court seeking to put a halt to Reconstruction.
Unsurprisingly, the southern states resisted federal reorganization of
their state government officials and operations, and one state, Georgia,
sued Edwin M. Stanton, the army officer overseeing its military district,
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, alleging that Congress
had sought to “overthrow and to annul” the existing government and
erect another one in its place without authority under the Constitution
and in violation of its republican guarantee.220 In Georgia v. Stanton,
the Court was confronted with a direct constitutional challenge to
Reconstruction.
Often overlooked is precisely how the Court in Stanton resolved
the claim, which turned as much on the remedy sought as on which
branch of government could make claims about the Clause’s meaning.
Justice Nelson, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that while Article
III federal courts had jurisdiction to entertain cases claiming violations
of private rights or property, they lacked judicial power to remedy
“merely political rights,” which the Court said did not belong to the
jurisdiction of courts.221 The Court held that it could not reasonably
grant the relief sought by Georgia—an order enjoining the army from
annulling the state government of Georgia, reestablishing it in
compliance with the Reconstruction Acts, and directly supervising state
and local as well as federal elections.222 Thus, because the challenge in
Stanton was to the stripping of political rights from the State of
Georgia, the Court concluded it had no jurisdiction to review such a
challenge to the constitutionality of Reconstruction.223
The Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve
political questions implicated by the legal challenge seeking to undo all
of Reconstruction: “[T]he rights for the protection of which our authority
is invoked, are the rights of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of
government, [and] of corporate existence as a State.”224 Justice Nelson
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 50–52 (1867).
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 77.
Id.
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clarified that had the plaintiffs brought a claim only for “protection of
the title and possession of [state] property” confiscated by the
provisional government, “[s]uch relief would have called for a very
different bill from the one before us.”225 Because the Court could not
grant relief over the claim sought, it declined subject matter jurisdiction
over the case and dismissed it entirely.226 It therefore never reached the
question of the extent of Congress’s power under the Republican
Guarantee Clause to intervene in the states in a manner that may affect
the private rights of individual citizens.227 Yet the Court did not
expressly disclaim its interpretive authority over the Clause altogether,
and instead declined jurisdiction over the claims raised by the State of
Georgia that would require it to second-guess Congress over its core
political prerogatives as part of Reconstruction.228
Though the Reconstruction period was aberrational in many
ways, Stanton cannot be understood as a one-off escape hatch for a
Court eager to sidestep a conflict with the political branches. A second,
less familiar post-Reconstruction dispute that drew on the Republican
Guarantee Clause came before the Court two terms later, with
seemingly lower stakes and yet a similar outcome—Texas v. White.229
Moreover, whereas the Court could escape interpreting the Clause by
claiming that Georgia’s claim in Stanton did not implicate private
rights, that approach to sidestepping the question would not last long.
White, which did implicate a private right of action, is often
overlooked among those seeking to understand what the Republican
Guarantee Clause may mean, despite providing perhaps the most lucid
judicial explanation of the federal government’s power under the
Clause. When the state of Texas seceded from the Union at the start of
the Civil War, it helped finance the Confederacy by selling off many of
the U.S. bonds in its possession; some were sold to the parties in the
case, White and Chiles.230 After the war was over and the federal
government had temporarily taken control of the Texas government,
the federally installed governor of Texas sought to reclaim the U.S.
bonds from White and Chiles, arguing that they had been seized by the
unlawful secessionist state government and improperly sold by the
secessionist
government’s
military
board
without
proper

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
(1885).
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476
Id. at 705–06.
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authorization.231 The Court accepted Texas’s argument, reasoning that
because the secessionist government had been unlawful in the first
place, and because the military board that sold the bonds had been
organized for the purposes of “levying war against the United States,”
any acts the board took were illegal and invalid, including the transfer
to White and Chiles.232 As a result, the exchange with White and Chiles
was “invalid and void,” and the rightful owner of the bonds was the
reconstructionist state government.233
In
considering
whether
the
federal
government’s
reestablishment of the Texas government had been proper, the Court
once again drew expressly on the Clause as the constitutional basis for
Reconstruction.234 The Court bluntly stated that “the power to carry
into effect the clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative power, and
resides in Congress.”235 The Court recognized that when the federal
government exercises power under the Clause, “as in the exercise of
every other constitutional power, a discretion in the choice of means is
necessarily allowed. It is essential only that the means must be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power
conferred . . . .”236
The Court’s express linkage of Congress’s powers to act under
the Republican Guarantee Clause with the Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article I, Section 8 is notable, and it suggests that the
Republican Guarantee Clause may sometimes raise justiciable,
nonpolitical questions.237 For if the Clause confers on Congress the
power to act in ways necessary and proper to fulfilling the guarantee,
then just as the federal courts can review whether congressional actions
taken under the Commerce Clause are “necessary and proper,” so too
could courts determine whether specific actions taken under the
Republican Guarantee Clause are necessary and proper.
That process would bear a striking similarity to the Court’s
review of Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement clause
powers in Katzenbach and Morgan, although the congressional efforts
in question were quite different. The Court in White considered whether
231. Id. at 709.
232. Id. at 732–33.
233. Id. at 733–34.
234. Id. at 729.
235. Id. at 730.
236. Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
237. See id. (utilizing “necessary and proper”). The Necessary and Proper Clause reads in
relevant part: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
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Congress, in legislating to ensure the “restoration of the State to its
constitutional relations” with the Union—a duty the Court suggested
Congress had under the Clause—had done so in a manner that was
necessary and proper for that task.238 In theory, one could infer from
the Court’s dicta that Congress’s duty under the Clause rests only in
ensuring the broad structural integrity of the constitutional relations
between a state and the Union. If so, then Congress might face a higher
bar to establish that a more everyday legislative intervention in the
affairs of a state are a necessary and proper means of fulfilling its duty
under the Clause, a question that is examined at length in Part IV,
below.
Nevertheless, White, like Stanton, seemed to endorse Congress’s
Reconstruction Acts as constitutionally premised in large part on the
Clause. As a result, the subsequent acts stemming from federal
intervention in the southern states were legally valid as well. White also
suggests that in reviewing federal legislation enacted under the Clause,
the proper interpretive framework is one similar to the necessary-andproper analysis the Court employed in cases such as Katzenbach and
Morgan, rather than the “congruence and proportionality” framework
of Boerne and other subsequent decisions, a distinction that will be
examined at greater length in Part IV.
A final note: although the Court exhibited great deference to
Congress in Stanton and White, it is notable that shortly thereafter the
Court imposed what has become known as the “equal footing” limit on
how Congress may impose conditions on the states under the Clause.
In Coyle v. Smith, the Court rejected a challenge to a 1910 state law
relocating Oklahoma’s capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City.239 That
challenge was at least indirectly predicated on the Clause, for the
congressional enabling act that admitted Oklahoma to the Union
required that Oklahoma retain as its capital the city of Guthrie, until
at least 1913.240 The Petitioner contended that Oklahoma had violated
the enabling act, and thus the Clause, by relocating its capital. The
Court concluded otherwise, holding that Congress, in acting under the
Clause and admitting a new state to the Union, could not impose terms
and conditions that differed from the existing states’ obligations, for
doing so would “deprive it of equality with other members of the
Union.”241 Coyle does not categorically exclude Congress from taking
any particular actions under the Clause, but it does suggest the Court

238.
239.
240.
241.

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 729.
221 U.S. 559, 563 (1911).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 567.
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will scrutinize whether those actions apply equally to all states, which
echoes the Court’s much more recent holding in Shelby County.
III. THE COURTS AS GUARANTORS OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
The preceding part examined the political branches’ Republican
Guarantee Clause constitutionalism. Yet in theory, “[t]he United
States” could also refer to the federal courts as guarantors—that is, if
the Clause raises only prudential rather than classical political
questions. This Part examines three different ways the courts may
serve as guarantors under the Clause. The first is to protect the states
from undue federal interference, an interpretation that came back into
vogue alongside the Supreme Court’s “New Federalism” jurisprudence
of the past several decades.242 A second interpretation is that the Clause
protects the citizens of the states (and potentially even their lawmakers)
from unduly unrepublican forms of state governance. That
interpretation has recently gained new traction as a result of ongoing
litigation in the Tenth Circuit. Finally, courts could serve as guarantors
by protecting citizens’ individual rights inherent in any government
said to be republican in form.
As I will explain, there are reasons to be skeptical of each of
these three interpretations of the Clause. Nevertheless, because the
Court’s statements about the Clause’s nonjusticiability in these cases
are better understood as raising prudential political questions, there is
no reason to think today’s Court would decline to hear any challenge to
actions in which Congress serves as the guarantor. That question will
be taken up in Part IV.
A. A Guarantee of Federal Noninterference in
Minimally Republican State Sovereigns
In contrast to a focus on what Congress or the President may do
in the name of the Clause, a contrasting understanding of the Clause’s
meaning is that it primarily exists to protect the states as beneficiaries,
with the courts serving as guarantors of the states’ republican selfgovernance. This understanding of the Clause would suggest a sort of
interstate compact, a mutual guarantee among separate sovereigns.
Because many antifederalists were wary of the possibility of the federal
government accumulating too much power, this interpretation of the
242. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the
New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2000) (describing how the Court’s New
Federalism jurisprudence evinces “the Court’s faith in the states as primary centers for republican
self-government”).
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Clause was promoted by antifederalists during the Constitution’s
ratification.243 Such an interpretation seems diametrically opposed to
the understanding articulated by the Court in rejecting Georgia’s claim
in Stanton, insofar as that understanding of the Clause would situate
it as protecting the States from unwanted interference by the federal
government in matters of state sovereignty.
Historically, the states’ rights interpretation was especially
popular among freeholders and slave owners resisting expansion of the
franchise in the early nineteenth century. Almost as soon as suffragists
began to make claims of enfranchisement rights derived from the
Clause, others, especially southern slaveholders, pushed back against
such interpretations, for they recognized that such an understanding of
the Clause’s meaning would almost certainly lead to a prohibition on
slavery as well. Writing during the time of the Dorr Rebellion, South
Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun—former Vice President to both
Presidents John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, and future
Secretary of State to President Tyler—was among those who vocally
opposed the Rebellion’s proposed understanding of the Clause’s
meaning.
Echoing the view of Elisha Potter in Rhode Island, as well as
statements attributed to James Madison in the Federalist Papers,244
Calhoun’s argument rested on the belief that properly understood, the
Clause actually limited federal power to intervene in the states’ internal
affairs, rather than enhanced it.245 Calhoun drew on the Clause’s
placement next to the Invasion and Domestic Violence Clauses to argue
that the three clauses combine to guarantee “the peace, safety, and
liberty of the States.”246 Reading the three clauses together, Calhoun
argued that the domestic violence provision protected the states from
internal conflict, the invasion provision from external invasion, and the
republican guarantee “from the ambition and usurpation
of . . . governments, or . . . rulers.”247 A variation on this view has been
echoed by in more recent constitutional law scholarship in the works of

243. See Williams, supra note 6, at 654–55.
244. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (writing
that because the guarantee “supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be
guaranteed,” as long as “the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are
guaranteed by the federal Constitution”).
245. See Vile, supra note 9, at 677–78 (citing Letter from John C. Calhoun to William Smith
(July 3, 1843), reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 270, 270–71 (C. Wilson ed., 1986))
(explaining Calhoun’s analysis).
246. Id. at 678 (quoting Letter from John C. Calhoun to William Smith, supra note 245, at
272).
247. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Letter from John C. Calhoun to William Smith, supra
note 245, at 272).
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Deborah Jones Merritt248 and Ryan Williams.249 Each has put forward
potential interpretations of the Clause as primarily addressing the
States and existing for the States’ benefit vis-à-vis the federal
government. And, indeed, at least during Justice O’Connor’s tenure on
the Supreme Court, this argument seemed to gain a modicum of
traction among the judiciary.
The modern scholarly version of this argument takes two forms.
The first is that the Clause, read alongside the Tenth Amendment,
bolsters the federalist structure of the Constitution, limiting the extent
to which the federal government can intrude into the sovereignty of the
states. Merritt has argued that as a matter of political theory, states
cannot enjoy republican governments unless they retain sufficient
autonomy so as to establish and maintain their own forms of
government; as a result, the Clause is best understood as implying a
modest restraint on the federal power to interfere with state
autonomy.250 On this reading, the Clause exists to ensure limits on
federal interference in state and local franchise251 and in the structure
and mechanics of state government,252 among other areas of state
sovereignty. Merritt has argued that “some exercises of national power
also shatter the republican bond between state voters and their state
representatives.”253 She has suggested that where the federal
government intrudes on state autonomy, the Clause may in fact be
justiciable, and courts should take up challenges under the Clause
when states believe the federal government has interfered in an
unwarranted—and unconstitutional—fashion.254
This position found some support in Justice O’Connor’s brief
considerations of the Clause in two challenges to federal intervention
in the states that came before the Court in the early 1990s. In the first,
Gregory v. Ashcroft, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, stated
that the authority of the people of the states to determine the
qualifications “of their most important government officials” lies “at ‘the

248. See Merritt, supra note 5 (arguing that states need sufficient autonomy to create their
own republican governments and that the Clause thus restricts the federal government’s power to
interfere with state autonomy).
249. See Williams, supra note 6 (arguing the Clause was meant to protect state sovereignty
and that before the federal government can exercise power under the Clause, it must seek approval
from the republican state government).
250. Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for
the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815 (1994).
251. See Merritt, supra note 5, at 36–40.
252. Id. at 40–50.
253. Merritt, supra note 250, at 816.
254. See Merritt, supra note 5, at 70–78.
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heart of representative government,’ ”255 a power not only reserved to
the states under the Tenth Amendment, but also “guaranteed them” by
the Republican Guarantee Clause.256 In the second case, New York v.
United States, the Court concluded that Congress had legislated beyond
its enumerated powers in violation of the Tenth Amendment, so it did
not directly rule on New York’s additional Republican Guarantee
Clause claim.257 Yet in dicta, Justice O’Connor briefly considered the
Clause’s possible applications, writing that the states might invoke the
Clause to limit overreach by the federal government.258 Justice
O’Connor suggested that “perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee
Clause present nonjusticiable political questions,” seeming to suggest
that in at least some circumstances judicial intervention on behalf of
the states under the Clause might be appropriate. 259
More recently, Ryan Williams has put forward a novel but
related argument drawing on an examination of the meaning of the
term “guarantee” at the time of the founding.260 Williams has
articulated how the Framers of the Constitution may have intended for
the Clause to function akin to treaty guarantees common in
international law around the founding era.261 According to this view,
such guarantees constituted diplomatic mutual compacts in which each
compacting nation-state would pledge its support to aid in preserving
the right or entitlement possessed by the other.262 Some support for this
“international law” interpretation of the Clause exists both in the
Federalist Papers and in early commentaries in the years after the
Constitution’s ratification.263 Williams also points to several state
judicial opinions during this era that suggest that the provision would
apply “only if a nonrepublican government were ‘imposed on’ a state by
‘external force,’ in which case ‘the arms of the Union’ would ‘be
employed to repel that force.’ ”264

255. 501 U.S. 455, 463 (1991) (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984)).
256. Id. To support this proposition, O’Connor cited Merritt’s law review article and Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973), which itself cited to Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849), for that proposition. Curiously, Luther is silent about the congressional power to prescribe
rules concerning the selection of state government officials. 48 U.S. at 41.
257. 505 U.S. 144, 184–85 (1992).
258. Id. at 185–86.
259. Id.
260. See Williams, supra note 6, at 671–74.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 615–20, 681.
263. See id. at 651–66.
264. Id. at 667–68 (quoting State ex rel. M’Cready v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1, 265 (S.C. 1834)
(opinion of Harper, J.)).
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The upshot of the international law interpretation is twofold.
First, if the Clause were to function like a treaty guarantee, this would
suggest that the individual (but “United”) states, rather the federal
government, would be the proper subject of the Clause, and thus the
only parties who could properly invoke it.265 On this interpretation, the
Clause would serve as a “safeguard of state autonomy and
independence . . . , empowering a guaranteed state to call upon the
assistance” of the federal government if necessary.266
The second consequence of the international law interpretation
is that any time the Clause “is invoked as a direct source of federal
power, . . . the exercise of such power will always involve a threshold
question regarding whether the existing republican government within
the state has, in fact, requested such assistance.”267 If not, the federal
government would “lack[ ] authority to invoke the Clause as a source of
power, no matter how dissatisfied individual state residents may be
with a state’s existing governmental arrangements or how inconsistent
such arrangements may be with federal authorities’ shared conception
of republican ideals.”268
This international law version of the state sovereignty
interpretation of the Clause raises two potential problems. The first is
that it seems in tension with the actions the federal government took
during Reconstruction. The Reconstruction Congress and President
Lincoln “were one in extending national power into areas of policy
traditionally reserved for the states”269 and in doing so on the basis of
the Clause. Congressional Democrats loudly opposed the Radical
Republicans’ attempts to ground the constitutionality of Reconstruction
in the Republican Guarantee Clause: “Whereas Republicans defined
republican government in terms of a state’s acceptance of the
Constitution and the Union and of its hostility toward slavery, the
Democrats defined it as self-government.”270 And yet the Democrats’
view not only lost out in Congress, but also in the courts.
As discussed above in Section II.B.4, in both Stanton and White
the Court sanctioned the federal government’s Reconstruction efforts
265. See id. at 675 (“[T]he text of the Guarantee Clause clearly identifies each ‘State’ as the
beneficiary, rather than the obligee, of the ‘guarantee’ the provision promises.”). This would seem
to be in conflict with comments attributed to Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 83, in which
he explained that “The United States, in their united or collective capacity, are the OBJECT to
which all general provisions in the Constitution must necessarily be construed to refer.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 244, at 502 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
266. Williams, supra note 6, at 660–61.
267. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
268. Id.
269. See BELZ, supra note 156, at 285.
270. Id. at 209.
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under the Clause, going so far as to set out a standard of review akin to
the Court’s “necessary and proper” review of congressional actions
taken under the Commerce Clause. Notably, this was precisely how
some congressional Republican leaders during Reconstruction had
defined the extent of Congress’s power to legislate under the Clause.271
Because the international law account of the Clause draws almost
exclusively on eighteenth century ratification-era evidence of linguistic
meaning of the term “guarantee,” this approach sidesteps the serious
and significant nineteenth century precedents that radically
restructured how we might understand the meaning of the Clause in
the wake of both Congress’s and the Court’s Reconstruction-era
interpretive precedents.
Given the Clause’s central role in ensuring the ratification of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments—amendments whose chief
purpose was to restrain the states and empower federal intervention—
it is difficult to afford the Clause this reading without calling into
question the legitimacy of those Amendments. One way to reconcile the
Clause’s history with this interpretation would be to suggest that the
Clause would permit unsolicited federal intervention in a state only in
times of extraordinary exigency. But even then, the international law
interpretation of the Clause does not fit comfortably alongside the
significant role the Clause played in legitimating Reconstruction and
ensuring the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
among the southern states. Many of those federal laws (as well as the
Amendments) continue to apply today, long after the Reconstructionera exigencies have abated.272 Indeed, they were enacted precisely to
recalibrate the balance of power, shifting more power to the federal
government at the expense of the states.273
As a matter of textual integrity, moreover, the international law
interpretation of the Clause also seems to render the Invasion and
Domestic Violence Clauses of Article IV, Section 4 largely superfluous.
After all, if the Republican Guarantee Clause exists only for invocation
by states seeking federal assistance, it is difficult to imagine the
circumstances in which an extant and republican-in-form state
government would have cause to seek federal remediation for defects in
the state’s republican form beyond those of foreign invasion or domestic
271. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
272. See Amar, supra note 154, at 112–13; see also Richard Primus & Cameron O. Kistler, The
Support-or-Advocacy Clauses, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3547579 [https://perma.cc/WM96-WVP2] (arguing that the “supportor-advocacy” clauses of the Civil Rights of Act of 1871 remain potentially powerful weapons for
protecting the integrity of federal elections).
273. See FONER, supra note 36, at 91.

Louk_galleyed (Do Not Delete)

728

4/10/2020 2:39 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3:673

violence. Those guarantees, of course, are provided by the Invasion and
Domestic Violence Clauses.274 In other words, if federal intervention
under the Clause may only be invoked by an existing republican
government of the given state—no matter how many individual
residents are dissatisfied with its form—then what purpose would a
republican guarantee have, as opposed to a more generic guarantee of
assistance to preserve governmental integrity altogether as provided by
those other clauses? A republican guarantee would have significance
only in circumstances in which the extant government was arguably not
republican in form. If so, it would presumably be the citizens out of
power, rather than those wielding it, who would need to seek assistance
from the federal government. (Indeed, that was precisely what
happened during the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island.) Otherwise, it is
difficult to imagine circumstances in which those in control of a state
government would call for federal intervention on the basis that the
government they control was not republican in form.
The state sovereignty and international law interpretations of
the Clause also do not resolve the question of how to determine when a
once-republican government is republican no longer, nor which branch
of the federal government may make that determination. Returning
again to the Civil War era, the decline of republican government was a
state of existence that Akhil Amar has argued had developed in the
southern states by the 1860s.275 After all, he notes, in the election of
1860, “Lincoln received not a single popular vote—not one!—south of
Virginia. One does not find such perfectly one-sided election returns or
such savagely skewed public debates in true republics.”276 It must be
the case, as the Court repeatedly countenanced in Luther, Stanton, and
White, that if and when a state government becomes sufficiently
antirepublican in form, some branch of the federal government must be
able to intervene under the Clause. In all three opinions, the Court
seemed to indicate it would be the political branches. After all, as
Madison wrote in Federalist No. 43 in explaining the purpose of the
republican guarantee, “[T]here are certain parts of the State
constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution
that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating
the wound to the other.”277 And earlier, in Federalist No. 21, Alexander
Hamilton argued that “[t]he natural cure for an ill administration in a
popular or representative constitution is a change of men. A guaranty

274.
275.
276.
277.

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 2.
AMAR, supra note 13, at 84–86.
Id. at 85.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 244, at 276 (James Madison).
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by the national authority would be as much leveled against the
usurpations of rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction
and sedition in the community.”278 As Amar has concluded, while the
Clause does guarantee a measure of governmental autonomy to the
states, this is only one side of the coin, and the “federal government may
(or perhaps must) intervene and restructure state government under
the invitation (or mandate)” of the Clause.279
B. A Guarantee Against Plebiscites and Delegations of
Lawful State Authority
A second interpretation of the Clause is that it functions as an
internal guarantee to the citizens of the states (and possibly also their
lawmakers) that state forms of lawmaking will remain republican in
character. Under this theory, the Clause would prohibit the states from
passing laws through means that supersede lawmaking done through
the republican form, such as by popular initiative overriding state laws
passed by the state legislature. This interpretation might also prohibit
forms of governance that are not directly operated by, or are not
accountable to, elected officials. Supreme Court precedent has long
seemed to foreclose such an interpretation, which has recently been
revived by the Tenth Circuit in ongoing litigation. This interpretation
traces its roots to objections to popular lawmaking that were part of the
progressive movement in the early part of the twentieth century. The
first such challenge to reach the Court was the 1912 case of Pacific
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,280 which raised the
question of whether the state of Oregon had ceased to be republican in
form when it adopted a law by popular initiative. While the Court did
reject this argument by citing Luther as having established the
nonjusticiability of the Clause,281 the Court in Pacific States declined to
say it raised a classical political question in all circumstances.282
Rather, the Court emphasized the troublesome breadth of the
remedy sought: the invalidation of a state law solely on the basis that
it had been enacted by popular initiative.283 Such relief, the Court
argued, “would necessarily affect the validity, not only of the particular
statute which is before us, but of every other statute passed in Oregon
278. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 244, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton).
279. Amar, supra note 5, at 754.
280. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
281. Id. at 149 (“It was long ago settled that the enforcement of this guaranty belonged to the
political department.”).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 141.
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since the adoption of the initiative and referendum.”284 Such relief
would in turn require the Court to render a verdict on the
constitutionality of every state statutory and constitutional provision
that had been enacted via popular initiative or referendum. In Oregon,
this constituted a substantial portion of its state laws. It was this act—
“to examine as a justiciable issue the contention as to the illegal
existence of a state”285—which the Court held to be improper, for it
would imply the power to “control the legislative department . . . in the
recognition of such new government and the admission of
representatives therefrom,” which in turn would “obliterate the division
between judicial authority and legislative power upon which the
Constitution rests.”286
The best reading of the claim in Pacific States is thus that it
raised prudential political questions better left to the political branches.
Despite this, Pacific States has been understood as firmly establishing
the wholesale nonjusticiability of the Clause, even though the Court
was careful to reserve some possibility that it could take up challenges
arising under the Clause in the future, provided they were “in a
controversy properly submitted, to enforce and uphold the applicable
provisions of the Constitution as to each and every exercise of
governmental power.”287 In the years after Pacific States, the Court cited
the case to reject challenges to several additional state actions: the
creation and taxation of park districts by probate judges and appointed
commissioners;288 the operation of a drainage district by a public
corporation;289 a state worker’s compensation board;290 and a state
referendum vetoing redistricting legislation passed by the state general
assembly,291 among others. In each circumstance, the Court denied that
the Clause permitted federal legal challenges to nonrepresentative
forms of lawmaking in the states.
This interpretation—that the Clause raises prudential rather
than classical political questions and therefore permits judicial
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 142.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
288. See Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 78–80 (1930) (“[I]t is well
settled that the questions arising under [the Clause] are political, not judicial, in character, and
thus are for the consideration of the Congress and not the courts.”).
289. See O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 247–48 (1915) (calling an attempt to invoke the
Clause “obviously futile” under the circumstances).
290. See Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234–35 (1917) (“As has been
decided repeatedly, the question whether this guaranty has been violated is not a judicial but a
political question, committed to Congress, and not to the courts.”).
291. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (explaining the “settled
rule” that questions as to whether the Clause has been violated are nonjusticiable).
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adjudication in at least some circumstances—has gained traction in at
least one federal court in recent years. In 2019, the Tenth Circuit held
in Kerr v. Polis that anti–direct democracy claims arising under the
Republican Guarantee Clause may be justiciable in certain
circumstances.292 Kerr has had a meandering, decades-long procedural
history, but it began as a challenge by a coalition of citizens’ groups and
state legislators to a Colorado constitutional amendment (the Colorado
Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, or “TABOR”), which was passed by popular
initiative and which requires a plebiscitary vote to affirm new tax
increases passed by the state legislature. TABOR also establishes a flat
cap on how much additional revenue the state government may spend
from one year to the next. Among the plaintiffs’ initial claims in Kerr
was that TABOR violated the Republican Guarantee Clause because it
removed the taxing power from Colorado’s legislative bodies such that
they are unable to fulfill their constitutionally mandated obligations
under the Colorado Constitution.293
In Kerr, the Tenth Circuit took note of Justice O’Connor’s dicta
in New York v. United States as an invitation to determine whether the
specific case before it fully satisfied any of the six factors identified in
Baker as requiring a finding of nonjusticiability.294 The court initially
declined to interpret the Clause as raising a classical political question,
concluding that the Clause itself does not obviously contain a textual
commitment to the political branches alone.295 The Tenth Circuit
instead contended that because “[t]he case before us requires that we
determine the meaning of a piece of constitutional text and then decide
whether a state constitutional provision contravenes the federal
command,” a claim raised under the Clause would not be automatically
nonjusticiable.296 In addition to a claim arising under the Clause,
plaintiffs also brought a claim that TABOR violated the Colorado
Enabling Act, the federal statute under which Colorado was admitted
to the Union as a state in 1875 and “which requires ‘[t]hat the
constitution [of Colorado] shall be republican in form.’ ”297 The district
court had initially concluded that even if the Republican Guarantee
292. 930 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 2019).
293. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1120–21 (D. Colo. 2012), opinion amended
and supplemented, No. 11-CV-01350-WJM-BNB, 2012 WL 4359076 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2012), aff’d
and remanded, 744 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem), and vacated,
824 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2016).
294. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927
(2015) (mem).
295. Id. at 1176–77.
296. Id. at 1180.
297. Id. at 1181–82 (alteration in original) (quoting Colorado Enabling Act, ch. 139, § 4, 18
Stat. 474, 474 (1875)).
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Clause claim was found nonjusticiable, the plaintiffs could proceed on
the statutory Enabling Act claim by alleging that TABOR violated the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution in contravening the Enabling
Act.298 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and concluded that
the Enabling Act claim was independently justiciable.299
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Circuit’s judgment
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,300
which explained the circumstances under which state representatives
have standing to bring constitutional claims in federal court; two of the
initial plaintiffs in Kerr were state legislators.301 On remand, the Tenth
Circuit dismissed the state legislators from the case, arguing that they
lacked both institutional and individual standing to bring the claim.302
After the case was remanded to the district court, the district court
dismissed the case entirely on the grounds that the political-subdivision
plaintiffs that had since been added to the case to preserve standing did
not in fact have standing to bring their claim.303
The case was once again appealed to the Tenth Circuit, and in
late July 2019, the Circuit reversed, concluding that those plaintiffs did
have standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage.304 The Tenth Circuit
reiterated that the claims brought by plaintiffs under the Republican
Guarantee Clause were not clearly nonjusticiable under the Clause, for
while the district court declared that it “ ‘d[id] not believe’ that the
requirement of a Constitution ‘republican in form’ stretches to the
political-subdivision plaintiffs,” that question was the merits question
at issue that could not be properly dismissed at this stage.305
On the one hand, given the Court’s jurisprudence in Pacific
States and, more recently, Rucho v. Common Cause,306 it seems unlikely
that the Court would suddenly find the Clause to grant the plaintiffs
judicial relief for their claim. On the other hand, the relief sought in
Kerr might be considerably narrower than that in Pacific States—
invalidating just the TABOR, and only on the narrow grounds that it
puts a total cap on annual expenditures that the Colorado legislature

298. Id. at 1182.
299. Id. at 1182–83.
300. Hickenlooper v. Kerr, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (granting certiorari to the Tenth Circuit,
vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the Tenth Circuit).
301. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
302. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 824 F.3d 1207, 1218 (10th Cir. 2016).
303. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1192 (D. Colo. 2017).
304. Kerr v. Polis, 930 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 2019).
305. Id. at 1198.
306. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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may allocate. It remains to be seen how this litigation will ultimately
resolve.
C. A Guarantee of Individual Rights Inherent in
Any Republican Form of Government
For much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
debate about the Clause’s meaning focused on whether it might also
convey individual rights directly to the citizens of the states. Thus,
many have contended that the Clause not only speaks to the branches
of government or the states, but also directly to the people, by way of
claims that individual citizens may bring to court regarding violations
of basic rights associated with a republican form of government. This
interpretation of the Clause has at least twice been rejected by the
Supreme Court, seemingly on the merits, which suggests that the
Clause is at least in some circumstances justiciable. Notably, both
cases—Minor v. Happersett307 and Plessy v. Ferguson308—are much
better known for their interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but both also raised related Republican Guarantee Clause claims. (This
is further evidence, as argued above in Part II, that until the late
nineteenth century, the Reconstruction Amendments and the
Republican Guarantee Clause were often invoked and interpreted
together.)
In Minor, suffragist Virginia Minor had been denied the right to
register to vote because she was not male, and the privileges of
citizenship guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment extended only to
men.309 Minor sued, arguing that not only did the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause bar Missouri from
prohibiting her the right to vote as a lawful citizen, but that the
Republican Guarantee Clause did too.310 It is well known that the
Supreme Court rejected Minor’s Privileges and Immunities Clause
argument, holding that federal citizenship status alone did not convey
the right to vote as set forth under state law.311
But the Court also rejected her Republican Guarantee Clause
claim, pointing to the “unmistakable evidence” that at the nation’s
founding, “all the citizens of the States were not invested with the right
of suffrage,” including women.312 On this basis, the Court concluded
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Minor, 88 U.S. at 165.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 170–71.
Id. at 176.
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that “it is certainly now too late to contend that a government is not
republican, within the meaning of this guaranty in the Constitution,
because women are not made voters.”313 Minor is often overlooked in
scholarship concerning the Clause, and yet the decision is among the
most relevant to lingering questions about whether the Clause may be
nonjusticiable in all circumstances.314
The Clause was considered again two decades later in the
anticanonical315 case of Plessy v. Ferguson.316 In Plessy, an eightmember majority declared that the doctrine of “separate but equal”
permitted state legislation that enforced racial segregation of train cars
despite the Fourteenth Amendment’s express textual prohibition on
racial discrimination by the states. Justice Harlan, alone in dissent,
vehemently disagreed with the majority’s resolution of the case,
arguing that they had misinterpreted the Fourteenth Amendment.317
But Justice Harlan also invoked the Republican Guarantee Clause as
an additional source of constitutional support to overturn the law.
Strikingly, he noted that either the courts or Congress could take action
to enforce the Clause, arguing that a state law that mandated “separate
but equal” treatment of the races “is inconsistent with the guaranty
given by the constitution to each state of a republican form of
government, and may be stricken down by congressional action.”318
IV. INTERPRETATION AS CONFRONTATION: THE COURT, CONGRESS, AND
THE MEANING OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARANTEE CLAUSE
It is the policy of the United States that . . . the integrity,
security, and accountability of the voting process must be
vigilantly protected, maintained, and enhanced in order
to protect and preserve electoral and participatory
democracy in the United States.319
Given today’s increasingly fraught battles around redistricting,
voting rights, and access to fair political participation, Justice Harlan’s
Plessy v. Ferguson dissent invites an intriguing question: Just what
313. Id.
314. As Erwin Chemerinsky has noted, “what is notable is that the Court ruled on the merits
of the issue.” Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 862.
315. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011).
316. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
317. Id. at 552–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 564. Of course, such an outcome was precisely what Congress had intended in the
first place when it enacted the Fourteenth Amendment, assisted by, and in order to fulfill, the
Republican Guarantee Clause.
319. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 1000(b)(2) (2019).
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could Congress “strike[ ] down”320 or seek to do under the Clause? As
the previous Parts have shown, the text, history, and constitutional
jurisprudence of the Clause together strongly suggest that the Clause
primarily addresses the political branches, especially Congress, and
that it conveys to Congress the power to take legislative action to ensure
the states have and maintain a republican form of government. If this
understanding is correct, then the appropriate inquiry turns to the
actions Congress might permissibly take to guarantee republican
governance, and—equally importantly—how courts might reasonably
review Congress’s interpretation of the Clause and its actions taken
under it. Given the Court’s juricentric turn in reviewing Congress’s
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement clause powers, it seems
improbable that the Court would decline any possible challenge to
congressional action arising under the Clause on the basis that such a
challenge raises a classical political question.
Complicating matters it that the Republican Guarantee Clause
is a somewhat unorthodox constitutional vehicle for legislation. After
all, implementing a “guarantee” of a “republican form of government”
is not the standard activity of a legislative body. How would Congress
define the indicia of a minimally republican form of government, and
how might it identify governmental forms, practices, or laws that fall
beneath that minimal floor? And what kinds of actions might Congress
take to remedy insufficiently republican forms of government? At the
outer pole, Congress’s Reconstruction-era legislative precedents
suggest that conditions such as slavery and the absolute denial of the
right to vote are plausible bases for federal intervention in the states’
electoral processes; the Court declined to second-guess these
interventions in Georgia v. Stanton. Moreover, the Clause was an
essential basis for the Reconstruction-era legislation that helped to
ensure the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
This suggests that the Clause may also serve as a federal tool to enforce
state compliance with federal prerogatives, at least as a condition for
full federal recognition. Yet precisely because Congress gave itself a
more straightforward toolkit for legislating via the Reconstruction
Amendments, the Republican Guarantee Clause seems, by comparison,
a heavier and more unwieldy legislative bludgeon.
It also remains unsettled how the Court would assess legislation
enacted directly under the Republican Guarantee Clause, and which of
several frameworks it might use to evaluate the constitutionality of
Congress’s actions. This is because the Court would not only have to
scrutinize the meaning that Congress associates with the term
320. 163 U.S. at 564 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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“republican form of government.” The Court would also need to
scrutinize the means by which Congress might implement that
guarantee, as well as the fit between Congress’s (or the Court’s)
definition of republican government and Congress’s legislative
guarantee. After all, as Shelby County v. Holder makes clear, even
where the Court may accept Congress’s constitutional basis for
legislation, it may nevertheless second-guess the fit between Congress’s
intervention and its evidentiary findings substantiating the need for a
prophylactic legislative remedy. That scrutiny seems all the more
probable in the case of the Republican Guarantee Clause given the
relatively uncharted territory such review would require.
This Part provides a preliminary analysis of how the Court
might be likely to confront claims of congressional interpretation of the
Republican Guarantee Clause.
A. A Twenty-First-Century Legislative Guarantee of
Republican State Governments
Numerous scholars have put forward extensive accounts of what
it means to constitute a republican form of government. A broad
consensus seems to be that at minimum, the will of the majority must
be reflected in the selection of legislators and government
representatives.321 And indeed, the original preclearance maps under
the 1965 Voting Rights Act targeted districts where either less than half
of eligible voters were registered to vote, or where less than half of those
eligible to vote did in fact vote in the last presidential election.322
On this basis, perhaps the most straightforward pathway by
which Congress might seek to legislate under the Clause would be to
enact a statutory scheme akin to the VRA’s section 4(b) preclearance
coverage formula struck down by the Court in Shelby County and
targeting districts where there is reason to think that state election
procedures function to thwart majority rule, as others have suggested
could be done under the Republican Guarantee Clause.323 Yet if the
Court were to deem this coverage formula sufficiently justified by
evidence of racially discriminatory practices prohibited by the Fifteenth
Amendment, such a formula would already be constitutional under

321. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (“Logically, in a society ostensibly
grounded on representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of
a State could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”); see also sources cited supra note 5 for
numerous arguments to this effect.
322. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 317–18 (1966) (discussing the findings
required for the applicability of the remedial sections of the Voting Rights Act).
323. See Chin, supra note 5, at 1562; Hasen, supra note 7, at 204–05.
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existing precedents. This means Congress would not need to invoke the
Clause to provide new preclearance coverage maps based on updated
findings of the states and localities whose state electoral processes have
functioned to discriminate against minority voters.
Many members of today’s Congress appear to be more ambitious,
however, for many seek to go beyond simply reinstating what the Court
struck down in Shelby County, particularly in tackling partisan
gerrymandering. And some, such as Carolyn Shapiro, have recently
called for Congress to invoke the Clause and legislate to address
partisan gerrymandering in the states.324 H.R. 1, the “For the People
Act,” which the House passed in early 2019, reaches farther than the
Voting Rights Act, for it also seeks to tackle partisan gerrymandering,
a problem that Congress has never before sought to curtail
legislatively.325 H.R. 1 requires all states to use independent
commissions to draw federal congressional lines; provides a cause of
action for citizens to challenge gerrymandered districts under federal
law; requires a uniform set of map-drawing requirements for every
state in the country; and provides a statutorily guaranteed role for
citizen review and feedback of proposed maps.326 As drafted, H.R. 1’s
provisions apply nearly uniformly to all states,327 rather than to only a
select number of targeted jurisdictions, as the preclearance maps of
section 4(b) of the VRA did. Thus H.R. 1 might draw less scrutiny
insofar as it treats all states equally, sidestepping the equal footing
doctrine that arose in Coyle v. Smith.328
Yet potential future legislation in the mold of H.R. 1 may be
considerably more invasive than the stricken provisions of the VRA, as
Congress has generally not legislated to regulate the drawing of
electoral districts in the states for federal elections, having left those
processes largely to the states, with a few exceptions enacted under the

324. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 188 (arguing that “[t]he ball is unmistakably in Congress’s
court” to address partisan gerrymandering in the states and to do so under the Clause).
325. Congress has, however, previously legislated to require that every federal congressional
district is fully contiguous. See Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491.
326. See Michael Li, Five Ways H.R. 1 Would Transform Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (June 19, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/five-ways-hr-1-would-transformredistricting [https://perma.cc/9RVG-R2ME].
327. H.R. 1 carves out an exception for Iowa, see For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th
Cong. § 2401(d), which already provides that redistricting be conducted by nonpartisan state
legislative staff members using a nonpartisan approach. See The “Iowa Model” for Redistricting,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/theiowa-model-for-redistricting.aspx [https://perma.cc/C8UL-D4V7].
328. 221 U.S. 559, 563 (1911). H.R. 1’s carve-out for Iowa, however, might arguably run afoul
of the equal footing doctrine. See supra notes 239–241 and accompanying text.
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Elections Clause.329 Unlike the preclearance maps used under the VRA,
moreover, H.R. 1 is not expressly tied to concerns about racial
discrimination in elections. The lack of a tie between partisan
gerrymandering and racial discrimination was one reason why the
Court in Rucho v. Common Cause concluded that a legal claim
challenging only partisan gerrymandering would be nonjusticiable.330
Moreover, while H.R. 1 cites as its constitutional basis Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause power to enforce Section
2’s Apportionment Clause,331 Congress has heretofore never attempted
to enforce that provision, which was functionally a dead letter even at
the time of the Amendment’s ratification.332
Other federal legislative reforms that would reach the conduct
of purely state and local elections in addition to federal ones would be
considered even more aggressive still. Whereas Congress may have a
more straightforward argument under the Elections Clause that they
may regulate various aspects of state rules related to federal
elections,333 the regulation of state and local elections does not seem to
be textually permitted under the Clause, which refers only to elections
for federal office.334 And it seems probable that were legislation like
H.R. 1 enacted into law, some states might seek to evade the full
application of federal law by creating two-tiered systems of voter
registration and electoral processes that distinguish between state and
local elections and federal elections.
Several states have already attempted this. In response to the
Court’s 2013 decision in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.
that the federal National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) precluded
Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement for voter registration,335 both
Arizona and Kansas sought to implement two-tier voter registration
329. In addition to requiring contiguous districts, Congress has also required that districts be
sufficiently compact, see Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734, and have equal
populations, see Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28, 28.
330. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019) (“Partisan gerrymandering claims have proved far more
difficult to adjudicate. . . . [This is because,] while it is illegal for a jurisdiction to depart from the
one-person, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination in districting, ‘a jurisdiction may
engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.’ ” (citation omitted)).
331. H.R. 1, § 2400(b)(2). H.R. 1 also cites to Congress’s Article I, Section 4 Elections Clause
power. Id. § 2400(b)(1).
332. See FONER, supra note 36, at 85 (“Section 2 . . . has never been implemented, even when
post-Reconstruction southern governments took the right to vote away from blacks.”).
333. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495 (“Congress has regularly exercised its Elections Clause
power, including to address partisan gerrymandering.”).
334. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.”).
335. 570 U.S. 1 (2013).
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systems.336 Kansas’s efforts were ultimately blocked by a state judge for
violating the Kansas Constitution,337 while Arizona eventually settled
a state lawsuit challenging its two-tier system.338 Other states that
have attempted to avoid application of the NVRA, including
Mississippi, were blocked by the VRA preclearance requirements struck
down by the Court in Shelby County.339 It seems probable that at least
some state governments would seek to avoid the reach of federal
interventions of the kind envisioned by H.R. 1, which could then spur
more interventionist responses from Congress that would reach the
conduct of purely state and local elections.
What has not been provided in prior scholarship, then, is a
thorough analysis of how contemporary courts might evaluate
challenges to congressional actions taken under the Republican
Guarantee Clause. This would include whether the Clause could
provide a constitutional basis for more than simply new preclearance
coverage formulas under the VRA, something that some scholars have
argued should already be permissible under the Fifteenth
Amendment.340 Indeed, there has yet to be a careful consideration of
how more expansive congressional actions taken under the Clause to
combat partisan gerrymandering or restrictions to ballot access could
fit within the contemporary Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
The Clause raises especially intriguing interpretive questions
given its unique textual structure as compared with the Reconstruction
Amendments. Those Amendments provide a relatively tidy division of
labor between the first sections, which enumerate specific individualrights guarantees (e.g., “The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”),341 and the
enforcement clauses that provide Congress with lawmaking authority
336. See Fernanda Santos & John Eligon, 2 States Plan 2-Tier System for Balloting, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/us/2-states-plan-2-tier-system-forballoting.html [https://perma.cc/9W5E-ZPRT].
337. See Memorandum Decision and Order, Brown v. Kobach, No. 2016-CV-550 (Kan. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/memorandum_decision_
brown_v_kobach_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/REV6-4RQB] (refusing to grant a permanent
injunction because “[t]he Defendant simply lacks the authority to create a two-tiered system of
voter registration”).
338. Arizona Settles Suit over Handling of Voter Registration, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 4,
2018), https://apnews.com/bb1efeb4d596426096e66b07da8f7ad1 [https://perma.cc/5EHN-MMT7].
339. See Ari Berman, Separate and Unequal Voting in Arizona and Kansas, NATION (Oct. 15,
2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/separate-and-unequal-voting-arizona-andkansas/ [https://perma.cc/3HLK-RZG8].
340. E.g., Travis Crum, Raising Red Flags About Shelby County, TAKE CARE BLOG (Oct. 15,
2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/raising-red-flags-about-shelby-county
[https://perma.cc/
7BK9-GN9J].
341. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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to prophylactically enforce them (e.g., “The Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).342
This textual ambiguity may also be the Clause’s virtue, however,
for the Clause may speak to the branches in distinctive ways, inviting
the different branches to give the Clause complementary rather than
competing meanings. The Clause might, for example, grant Congress
more expansive or intensive power in acting as a guarantor of
republican governance than that possessed by the Court, at least in
circumstances where the Court concludes the guarantee is better
fulfilled by the political branches than by courts. Indeed, if there is any
portion of the Constitution that seems to warrant a departmentalist
approach to constitutional interpretation inviting multiple branches to
enforce the Constitution, it is the Republican Guarantee Clause. There
is no other part of the Constitution that so explicitly links state-level
governance practices to federal scrutiny, nor that leaves open the
possibility that all branches may have some role in acting as
guarantors.
B. Constitutional Confrontation: How the Court Might Review
Congressional Action and Interpretation
Were Congress to expressly premise federal legislation such as
H.R. 1 or a reinvigorated Voting Rights Act under the Republican
Guarantee Clause, two important questions would emerge. First, which
parties would have standing to sue—state or local actors, or other
parties who have a constitutional injury whose nexus could be fairly
traced to the legislation? Second, if at least some parties would have
standing, would the Court find justiciable a challenge to Congress’s
power to legislate under the Clause? This, of course, is what is at stake
in determining whether the interpretation of the Clause raises classical
or prudential political questions.
If the Clause’s interpretation raises prudential political
questions, and the Court were to conclude that a claim challenging
federal legislation enacted under it is justiciable, then the Court would
then be tasked with providing an authoritative and affirmative
interpretation of the Clause—something it has managed to avoid doing
for well over two centuries. And even if the Court provided some
minimal and vague account of what the Clause means, permits, or
requires, interesting questions would arise about whether and how the
Court might recognize a separate role for Congress in interpreting and
enforcing the Republican Guarantee Clause vis-à-vis the courts. After
342. Id. § 2.

Louk_galleyed (Do Not Delete)

2020]

4/10/2020 2:39 PM

GUARANTEEING REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

741

all, there may be deficiencies in state governments not easily rectified
by courts, as the majority suggested in Rucho.343 The history of federal
Reconstruction—and the Court’s deferential jurisprudence to Congress
during that period—also suggest the Clause may provide the political
branches with significant power, at least in extraordinary
circumstances.
1. Justiciability
The first question a court would face in hearing a claim
challenging Congress’s power to act under the Clause would be whether
the claim raised either a classical or prudential political question that
would preclude judicial review altogether. If the Republican Guarantee
Clause raises classical political questions, then the Clause might be
effectively off limits to the Court altogether. Dicta in the Court’s
jurisprudence suggests the Court might decline to intervene entirely.
For example, in Stanton the Court concluded that the challenges
related to federal Reconstruction and Congress’s power to implement it
through federal legislation raised political questions about the
relationship between Congress and the southern states that were
inappropriate for judicial involvement.344 And in 2019, the Court in
Rucho seemed to definitively reiterate the broad claim that the Court
“has several times concluded . . . that the Guarantee Clause does not
provide the basis for a justiciable claim.”345
There is good reason, however, to be suspicious that the Court
would treat legal challenges to Congress’s power to legislate under the
Clause as raising wholly nonjusticiable classical political questions,
notwithstanding some reasoned speculation that the Court might be
eager to sidestep the interpretive conflict altogether.346 First, as
discussed in Part I, the Court has in recent decades been increasingly
hostile to the notion that Congress may interpret the Constitution in a
manner that deviates in any meaningful way from the Court’s, even in
complex matters of judgment about the appropriate remedy to stave off
violations of rights protected under the Reconstruction Amendments.
343. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019) (“Any judicial decision on what
is ‘fair’ in this context would be an ‘unmoored determination’ of the sort characteristic of a political
question beyond the competence of the federal courts.” (quoting Zivotosfky v. Clinton, 566 U.S.
189, 196 (2012)).
344. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867). See generally supra Section II.B.2.
345. 139 S. Ct. at 2506.
346. See Chin, supra note 5, at 1586 (“[I]f [a] new Act is clearly a bona fide effort to enforce the
Guarantee Clause (among other provisions of the Constitution), its validity should be regarded as
a political question.”); Hasen, supra note 7, at 206 (“The Court might not want to open itself up to
Guarantee Clause claims, which will draw the Court even further in the political thicket.”).
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In a string of cases beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court
has repeatedly held that there must be congruence and proportionality
between the right protected under the Amendment in question and
Congress’s prophylactic legislation that seeks to protect that right.347
Since the Court has seemed disinclined to defer to Congress in deciding
which responses might be proportional under those Amendments, it
seems unlikely the Court would defer entirely to Congress’s
interpretation of the Clause, either.
Second, the kind of election-reform and anti-gerrymandering
legislation Congress would be most likely to pass under the Clause
would be in response to very different political conditions than those the
country faced when the Reconstruction Acts were enacted after the Civil
War. The late 1860s were an extraordinary period in American history,
and the federal government faced grave circumstances during this
period that necessitated unprecedented federal intervention in the
southern states. In some sense, the Court in Stanton had little choice
but to decline to intervene. It seems highly improbable that the federal
government would have ceased Reconstruction simply because the
Court told it to. The Court’s nonjusticiability holding in Stanton might
therefore be better explained as a form of prudential political question
deference, rather than a holding as to the inherent nonjusticiability of
the Clause in all circumstances. Moreover, the Court did seem to reach
the merits of claims arising under the Clause in Minor v. Happersett,
Plessy v. Ferguson, and Coyle v. Smith, and it flirted with doing so more
recently in New York v. United States.348 Those holdings suggest that
the Court has not concluded that the interpretation of the Clause
speaks only to the political branches.
Compared with Reconstruction, modern-day federal election
reform legislation would have a character far more familiar to modern
lawyers. The contemporary Court has repeatedly struck down federal
legislation that it has held exceeds Congress’s constitutional
lawmaking authority.349 It has also struck down federal legislation in
violation of the Tenth Amendment, a constraint on federal legislative
power not widely recognized by courts between the Reconstruction era
and Warren Court, but which the modern-day Court—beginning with
the Burger Court in the mid-1970s350—has repeatedly invoked as a
347. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), superseded in part by statute, Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as
recognized in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
348. See supra notes 294, 309–318 and accompanying text.
349. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
350. See David Scott Louk, Repairing the Irreparable: Revisiting the Federalism Decisions of
the Burger Court, 125 YALE L.J. 682 (2016).
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safeguard to preserve states as coequals in the American federal
system.351 When the Court in Shelby County struck down portions of
the Voting Rights Act, it saw no reason to defer on the basis of
prudential political question concerns. Accordingly, there is no good
reason to think similar kinds of legislation enacted under the
Republican Guarantee Clause would be treated differently today,
provided the Clause does in fact raise prudential rather than classical
political questions.
The critical question is thus not whether the Court would be
inclined to find challenges to legislation enacted under the Clause fully
nonjusticiable—that seems improbable given the Court’s post-Boerne
jurisprudence. Rather, the novel question is how the Court would
resolve such challenges, for striking down legislation as exceeding
Congress’s power under the Clause would put the Court in a somewhat
awkward position. After all, the Court recently disclaimed any judicial
responsibility for partisan gerrymandering whatsoever in Rucho, and
even seemed to hint that Congress, not the courts, should be the branch
to remediate such conditions.352 Given that dicta, it would be odd for the
Court to invoke the Tenth Amendment as a safeguard against federal
intervention altogether.
2. The Meaning of Each Part of the Clause
Assuming challenges to federal legislation enacted under the
Republican Guarantee Clause are neither nonjusticiable per se nor
categorically in violation of the Tenth Amendment, then the Court
would be confronted with interpreting one or more portions of the
Clause. In so doing, it would have to decide whether to defer to
Congress’s interpretation both of the meaning of the Clause’s guarantee
as well as the appropriateness of Congress’s intervention as guarantor.
This raises issues about who or what constitutes “[t]he United States”;
what actions may be considered a permissible form of “guarantee”; what
“Form[s] of Government” can be said to be “Republican”; and which
branch of government should decide each of these three questions. This
section briefly addresses each, drawing on the historical and legal
materials reviewed above.

351. E.g., Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
352. Rucho v. Common Clause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (“[T]he Framers gave Congress
the power to do something about partisan gerrymandering in the Elections Clause.”).
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a. “The United States”
As to which branches or institutions constitute “[t]he United
States,” the Court’s own precedents clearly establish that in at least
some circumstances, Congress may act as the United States for the
purposes of the Republican Guarantee Clause. The Clause was a chief
constitutional premise behind the federal Reconstruction Acts in the
wake of the Civil War, and the Court seemed to tacitly endorse this
understanding in Stanton when it wrote that the actions Congress took
under the Clause with regard to Reconstruction were political questions
best left to the political branches.353 It reiterated this understanding
even more bluntly in Texas v. White, when it stated that “the power to
carry into effect the clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative power,
and resides in Congress.”354 And, as Akhil Amar has argued, such an
understanding is further reinforced by the ratification processes of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which were themselves
predicated on Congress’s powers under the Clause.355
b. A “Republican Form of Government”
If the Clause is interpreted such that “[t]he United States”
includes Congress as a guarantor, the question would then shift to
examining what it means to be a “Republican Form of Government.”
This portion of the Clause has traditionally received the bulk of
proposed interpretations, for debates about what constitutes a
republican form of government have extended well beyond both the
Clause and American legal jurisprudence more generally. Arguably, the
most straightforward approach would be for the Court to reinvigorate
arguments first made by preservationists like John C. Calhoun that
whatever form of government the states had when first admitted, that
form necessarily constitutes an adequately republican form for the
purposes of the Clause’s guarantee.356 There are at least three potential
rebuttals to the founding-era status quo argument.
First, the arguments of Calhoun and other slaveholders predate
the Reconstruction Amendments and all that has come since.
Reconstruction-era constitutionalism obviates much of the viability of
that interpretation, for none of the southern states were permitted to
restore full relations with the Union on the terms of their antebellum
353. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867).
354. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S.
476 (1885).
355. Amar, supra note 154, at 112.
356. See supra Section III.A.
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state constitutions. Instead, full federal recognition of those state
governments was predicated on compliance with the Reconstruction
Acts in developing new state constitutions, as well as in ratifying the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Congress justified its
legislative mandates in part on the basis of its powers under the Clause.
It does not seem credible to argue that structures of representative
governance at the founding—like those in Dorr’s Rhode Island that
denied the vote to women, people of color, and males without property—
would be said to be republican in form today. At a minimum, the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the
heightened conditions imposed on states admitted to the Union after
the Civil War, have all altered the constitutional floor for American
republican government. This transformation hardly ended at
Reconstruction. The Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments, and the Court’s incorporation doctrine under the
Fourteenth Amendment,357 have continued to alter the minimal
contours of the states’ republican governments. This argument might
also find support in recent theories of constitutional liquidation, the
Madisonian notion that indeterminate constitutional provisions may
take on meaning over time through a deliberate course of practice and
a settlement as to their meaning.358
Second, Congress might argue that the founding-era status quo
definition of republican government sets a floor, but not a ceiling, for
federal supervision. In this sense, Congress might be said to have
historically underenforced its guarantee. This was the argument
Charles Sumner made during congressional debates over
Reconstruction: while Congress’s “mighty power” under the Clause had
been “[a]sleep,” it remained available for enforcement when
necessary.359 Certainly, the rapid escalation of federal intervention in
the states’ government affairs during Reconstruction suggests that
Congress had kept at least some of its constitutional powder dry in the
near century between the founding era and Reconstruction. Minor did
hold that the Clause does not create evolving justiciable rights for
citizens vis-à-vis their states beyond what had been guaranteed at the
state’s admission.360 Yet that understanding does not preclude a
reading of the Clause as providing Congress with unexercised powers to
act. As Justice Harlan argued in his famous dissent in Plessy, even if
the Clause afforded no judicial remedy to inequality stemming from

357.
358.
359.
360.

See AMAR, supra note 13, at 86–87.
See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–21 (2019).
See supra notes 205–208.
See supra notes 309–314.
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segregation, Congress nevertheless had the reserved power under the
Clause to intervene and remediate such inequality.361
Third, even if the Clause stands for some kind of status-quo
preservation understanding of republicanism, Congress may still have
legitimate grounds to act under the Clause. Many of the ambitions of
H.R. 1-like legislation could be understood as responding to significant
alterations in the status quo of state electoral processes over the prior
decade. Indeed, federal skepticism of change pervades the VRA. Its
preclearance regime was predicated on the assumption that changes to
state electoral processes warranted heightened federal scrutiny in
covered jurisdictions with a history of election laws that resulted in
diminished political participation and ballot access. On this basis,
Congress might very well argue that federal legislation that seeks to
address recent state-level changes in electoral processes serves to
ensure that states do not fall below an acceptable floor of twenty-firstcentury republican governance.
If the Court rejected the founding-era status quo interpretation
of the Clause, its interpretive inquiry would likely hew closely to the
challenged congressional act in question: namely, (a) whether the Court
must or should defer to Congress’s definition of what constitutes a
minimally republican form of government; and (b) if the Court were to
defer, whether a role would remain for the Court to examine whether
Congress’s actions in furtherance of fulfilling the guarantee are
sufficiently linked to the definition of republican governance provided.
The first inquiry is likely to turn on how expansive or ambitious
Congress’s proposed baseline for a republican form of government may
be. An interpretation of the Clause as simply requiring majority rule
would seem to be very hard to second-guess, as that interpretation of
the Clause permeates both founding-era and Civil War–era discourses
around the meaning of republican government.362 It is also widely
accepted among modern scholars.363 In this sense, Congress might
argue that the concept of a republican form of government has not
changed from the founding era, but the particular conception has, given
changes in constitutional understandings of whom “the majority”
consists.364

361. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
362. See Amar, supra note 5, at 761–66, 778–86.
363. See sources cited supra note 5.
364. Akhil Amar has referred to this the “denominator problem.” See Amar, supra note 5. For
an especially helpful examination of the distinction between constitutional concepts and
conceptions, and the circumstances under which the Constitution may set out constitutional
conceptions that could evolve over time, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 42–61 (2015).
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If so, then the Court’s inquiry would likely turn to the fit
between potential identified failures of majority rule in the states and
the congressional interventions enacted under the Clause to remediate
those shortcomings. After all, the majority in Shelby County did not
disclaim Congress’s ability to require preclearance under section 4(b) of
the VRA under any circumstances; rather, the Court concluded that the
record of evidence Congress introduced during the VRA’s reenactment
was insufficient to justify maintaining the same preclearance coverage
maps that had been upheld in the past.365 Assuming arguendo that the
majority rule definition were a plausible interpretation, it seems
probable that the Court would instead focus on whether Congress’s
legislative remedies were appropriately tailored.
c. “Guarantee”
The locus of the constitutional confrontation between the
branches would thus hinge on what Congress may do in furthering a
guarantee of a republican form of government, and the extent of the
evidence, if any, Congress must put forward to substantiate the basis
for its actions as guarantor. At the outset, it is important to note that
the interpretation of “guarantee” in the Clause is complicated by the
fact that the text of the Clause seems to mandate a guarantee. The
guarantee is preceded by the verb “shall” rather than the verb “may,”
and “shall” in legal interpretation is usually understood to convey an
imperative meaning. It was in this sense that both the Dorr Rebellion
and the charter government during the crisis in Rhode Island had
petitioned the President to intervene, urging that the federal
government had an affirmative responsibility to intercede.366
Nevertheless, neither the President nor Congress intervened, and when
the Court addressed the Clause’s meaning in Luther, it declined to find
that either Congress or the President had any affirmative responsibility
under the Clause short of the imposition of permanent martial law in a
state.367
What else might the Clause mean by “guarantee”? Perhaps the
most thorough argument about the meaning of “guarantee” is the
international law interpretation proffered by Ryan Williams. On this
view, the guarantee might function akin to the mutual-compact
guarantees that nation-states made with one another as parties to
international treaties during and before the founding era in the mid-to-

365. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 554 (2013).
366. See supra notes 130–137 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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late eighteenth century.368 Whatever specific actions Congress might
take under that guarantee, the guarantee itself could only be triggered
by a state government petitioning Congress to intervene on its behalf.369
That interpretation, although not grounded in the text alone, would at
least logically address the grammatical matter of what it means for the
guarantee to be an imperative: where a state petitions the federal
government to intervene, it shall respond by acting to guarantee.
But as discussed above in Section III.A.2, that interpretation
raises its own problems. It is difficult to imagine circumstances under
which a sitting state government—already republican in form—would
petition Congress or the president to intervene to guarantee its
republican nature. After all, were it invaded by outside forces, or facing
domestic violence from within, the Constitution already provides
mechanisms for the sitting state government to seek help: the Invasion
and Domestic Violence Clauses of Article IV, Section 4, whose
mechanisms reside in the very same sentence as the Republican
Guarantee Clause, and which expressly identify the role of Congress
and the president in response.370 That view also seems to have been
rejected during the Dorr Rebellion, for President Tyler spurned the
Rhode Island charter government’s argument that he had an obligation
to intervene on the basis of the Clause.371
A second problem is that the Supreme Court would not be
interpreting the Clause against a blank slate today: the Clause played
a central role in American constitutionalism during and immediately
after the Civil War. It provided the basis for helping to ensure the
ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and provided
the federal government with the constitutional basis for its actions
during Reconstruction more generally, actions which the Court declined
to second-guess. None of those actions were premised on a petition from
one of the Confederate state governments that had seceded from the
Union. The most applicable direct historical precedent thus seems to
bely the international treaty law interpretation of the meaning of the
term “guarantee.” And for the reasons stated above, even if one were
inclined to look past the Court’s formal Reconstruction-era precedents,
the Reconstruction Amendments—as well as the Nineteenth, TwentyFourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments—have so fundamentally
368. See supra notes 260–264 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 265–266 and accompanying text.
370. To repeat, Article IV, Section 4 reads in full: “The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
371. See supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text.
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altered the constitutional minima for modern American republican
governmental institutions that whatever a republican form of
government meant at the founding seems incidental to any reasonable
meaning of that term today.
A third problem with reading too much into the “shall
guarantee” imperative is that it is not clear that anyone can require
either the courts or the political branches to provide the guarantee.
After all, claims brought directly under the Clause are the ones to have
been found nonjusticiable. It is improbable that an individual or state
could sue seeking Congress’s affirmative obligation to act as a
guarantor under the Clause. And if such a claim were nonjusticiable, as
seems likely, it is not clear precisely what it would mean to say that the
guarantee sets out an unenforceable mandate. The phrase may be
better understood as explicitly empowering the political branches to
monitor and determine when particular circumstances in a given state
might warrant a federal response.
Another possibility is that the guarantee could be understood as
an emergency powers provision that applies only in extreme
circumstances akin to the instances of invasion and domestic violence
contemplated in the other clauses of Article IV, Section 4. The Court’s
Reconstruction-era jurisprudence is perhaps best squared with an
emergency powers interpretation. The Court’s tacit endorsement of
Congress’s actions in Stanton and White seemed to acknowledge the
deference the courts owe the political branches in times of great
exigency where the relationships between the ex-Confederate states
and the Union had been upended. Yet for that reason, these cases are
of limited utility. Both involved challenges to legislative acts associated
with restoring ordinary relations between the states and the Union,
rather than legislative acts regulating the everyday affairs of alreadyestablished state governments. A very narrow understanding of those
precedents might suggest that few if any ordinary legislative actions
could be enacted under the Clause.
At a minimum, then, federal action taken under the Clause
during periods in which the political processes at the state level can be
said to be in existential crisis—as during and after the Civil War—
might constitute circumstances in which even the Court would be
disinclined to second-guess the political branches. Should a genuine
constitutional crisis emerge within a state, the Court would presumably
permit Congress (or the president) to rely on the Clause as a
constitutional justification to intervene, as was done during the
Reconstruction era after the Civil War.
But this approach simply reconfigures the problem, for then the
questions would be: What constitutes a state-level constitutional
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emergency of republican governance, and who decides? And would the
Court have the authority to second-guess a congressional determination
that problems with state-level republican governance are of a
sufficiently serious nature to warrant federal intervention under the
Clause? Consider, for example, the case of a state governor postponing
a state election due to alleged emergency circumstances—in the case of
2020’s coronavirus pandemic, hardly a hypothetical.372 If a state
election were postponed indefinitely, even over a state court’s
instructions to the contrary, at what point would this constitute an
emergency for which Congress would be justified in intervening under
the Clause? And what arguments might those opposing federal
intervention wield against it?373
Other hypotheticals, such as a federal mandate to implement
mandatory mail-in balloting or no-excuse absentee voting in all local,
state, and federal elections during a national health emergency, might
also be conceivable—as election law scholars have called for in response
to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic.374 It seems plausible that a national
pandemic may warrant congressional intervention in the states in ways
that would be impermissible in ordinary times.
What of less extreme exigencies? Some contend that the state of
partisan gerrymandering in many states is a constitutional crisis.375 If
a majority of both houses of Congress were to agree, would it be
appropriate for the Court to second-guess them, especially in matters
related to election hacking, widespread voter disenfranchisement, or
other tampering with voter rolls or ballots? The Court has tended to be
much more deferential to the political branches in matters of national
security,376 and so the question is whether the Court would tread

372. See Zach Montellaro & Alice Miranda Ollstein, Ohio Governor Shutters Polling Places for
Tuesday’s
Primary,
Citing
Public
Health,
POLITICO
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/16/ohio-governor-recommends-postponing-tuesdaysprimary-132340 [https://perma.cc/E9R3-572V].
373. See, e.g., Ned Foley, Public Health, Closing Polls, and the Tenth Amendment, ELECTION
L. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:24 PM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110123#more-110123
[https://perma.cc/JD8P-9JDQ] (arguing that the Tenth Amendment would protect the states from
federal intervention in their state and local election procedures).
374. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, How to Protect the 2020 Election from the Coronavirus, SLATE
(Mar. 13, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/2020-election-coronavirus-bill-voteby-mail.html [https://perma.cc/Q9ZC-VRTG].
375. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 97–98 (“The deft art of gerrymandering . . . is key
to understanding the decline of democracy in America.”); Shapiro, supra note 7, at 186 (arguing
that extreme partisan gerrymandering risks “the erosion of fundamental democratic norms and
practices”).
376. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009)
(analyzing several cases in which the Court has given more deference in matters of national
security and arguing that such deference is only justified in limited circumstances).
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equally lightly in matters of domestic election security, especially where
national security concerns may overlap with election meddling.377
A final possibility, explored further below, is that the plausibility
of Congress’s claim to urgency may hinge in large part on whether other
less invasive avenues remain available to remedy the identified
problem. If a recalcitrant state government suspended elections,
Congress or the president might be better suited to act than the federal
courts. In the case of extensive cyberattacks to the states’ election
infrastructure, election meddling concerns might be better addressed
through carefully tailored uniform national standards than by
piecemeal state responses or judicial interventions. And if neither the
state nor federal courts appear able to remedy widespread partisan
gerrymandering, congressional intervention under the Clause may
present the only remaining avenue.
3. Modes of Judicial Scrutiny
Assuming the Court were to review the appropriateness of
congressional actions taken to “guarantee” a republican form of
government, the next question would be the form of scrutiny the Court
would apply to that review. At least four approaches to assessing the
appropriateness of Congress’s actions as guarantor seem plausible.
a. The Katzenbach “Any Rational Means” Analysis
The first, most permissive form of review would be to find that
the Clause is primarily addressed to Congress, and so the Court’s
review should be widely deferential. That approach might be similar to
the “any rational means” review under the Fifteenth Amendment that
the Court announced in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.378 This could
manifest as a broad version of the general theory of departmentalism
articulated by Michael McConnell and Michael Stokes Paulsen, among
others. Paulsen has argued that where the underlying constitutional
provision is fairly susceptible to two or more different readings that are
consistent with text, history, and other relevant sources, then the Court
cannot say Congress has acted beyond its authority if it has passed
enforcement legislation based on one of those readings, even if the

377. E.g., Steve Holland & Jeff Mason, Trump National Security Team Says Russia Behind
Effort to Meddle in U.S. Elections, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-election-security/trump-national-security-team-says-russia-behind-effort-to-meddle-in-uselections-idUSKBN1KN2KQ [https://perma.cc/UDY9-UJDK] (documenting the role of federal
national security agencies in identifying foreign threats to domestic election integrity).
378. See 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
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Court—for the purposes of its own enforcement—would have thought
another reading was superior.379
McConnell has described this argument as the “ ‘presumption of
constitutionality,’ under which Acts of Congress are presumed
constitutional unless they are plainly foreclosed by the pertinent legal
materials.”380 After all, McConnell argues, there is a general principle
that “each branch of government has the authority to interpret the
Constitution for itself, within the scope of its own powers.”381 On this
view, as long as the scope of Congress’s guarantor actions were not
implausibly beyond the reach of the Clause’s guarantee of republican
government, the Court would not second-guess the precise actions
taken under it, provided that the means are rational. Given the Court’s
juricentric turn since Boerne, however, it is questionable that the Court
would be likely to embrace such a potentially wide-reaching form of
constitutional departmentalism. This approach is also a bit of an
awkward fit for the Clause, insofar as it would not resolve the problem
of what, precisely, a republican form of government might entail. And
if Congress could take any action under the Clause generally furthering
“majority rule” elections, this would seem to permit a fairly substantial
role for the federal government in an area traditionally left to the states.
b. The Boerne “Congruence and Proportionality” Analysis
A second, more restrictive approach would be to adopt the
“congruence and proportionality” framework that the Court first
announced in Boerne and has since applied in a number of cases
reviewing congressional legislative power under the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While less deferential than
either the rational-means or necessary-and-proper tests, the Court has
upheld legislation under this test in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs382 and Tennessee v. Lane.383 Yet in most other cases
in which the Court has invoked this test, it has struck down legislation
as reaching beyond Congress’s constitutional powers. Precisely how the
test might apply here would depend on the specific contours of the
legislation in question.
What might make this approach less suitable, however, is that
it would require the Court to both (a) define the precise contours of the
379. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code,
56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 252 n.10 (1995).
380. McConnell, supra note 49, at 172–73.
381. Id. at 171.
382. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
383. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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meaning of republican governance, and then (b) decide whether the
federal legislation was proportionate to that specific definition.
Precisely because the guarantee is so vague and indeterminate, this
approach would require the Court to provide a specific and affirmative
definition of the meaning of a republican form of government,
something it has thus far sought to avoid. This standard of review is
less suitable for legislation enacted under the Clause than for
legislation enforcing the specific rights set out in the Reconstruction
Amendments, where decades of judicial precedents exist to guide courts
in assessing the fit between the prophylactic legislation and the right
protected.
c. A Departmentalist “Necessary and Proper” Analysis
A final, more departmentalist approach would focus on whether
other avenues to remediate the issue in question were unavailable.
Under this standard of review, the Court would examine which branch
of government is best suited to remediate the problem identified by
Congress, as well as what other legal or constitutional avenues had
already been exhausted. For example, if, per the majority in Rucho,
partisan gerrymanders cannot be remedied by the federal courts, then
a plausible argument exists that Congress could act to ensure that state
elections provide for majority-rule outcomes, especially if Congress
were to point to evidence that neither state courts nor the states’
political processes could effectively address the issue.
This might manifest as a variation of the Katzenbach v. Morgan
“necessary and proper” standard of review of congressional actions
taken under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause,
borrowing from McCulloch’s three-part inquiry.384 Notably, this
approach to judicial review of federal legislation enacted under the
Clause was also the one envisioned by the Court in dicta in White.385
That inquiry would examine (a) whether the enactment is “appropriate
legislation” to enforce the Clause;386 (b) whether it is “plainly adapted”
to furthering the aims of the Clause;387 and (c) whether the legislation
is “consistent ‘with the letter and spirit of the constitution.’ ”388 Analysis
of the first two prongs would depend heavily on the specific legislation
in question, but the third one would, in turn, require the Court to
determine whether Congress’s interpretation of the Clause comported
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650–51 (1966).
See supra notes 234–237 and accompanying text.
Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651.
Id. at 652–63.
Id. at 656–57.
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wholly, or at least “in spirit,” with its own. To the degree the Clause is
understood to grant Congress power to act in certain urgent contexts,
this flexible approach would recognize the departmentalist potential of
the Clause in at least some limited circumstances. That the subject of
the Clause is “[t]he United States” suggests that each of the branches
of government might, under certain circumstances, play a role in
guaranteeing a republican form of government in the states. And if, as
the Court has continued to hold, there is little or no room for the courts
to provide the guarantee directly, then there may be at least some
narrow range of permissible actions that Congress could take.
Such a constitutional division of labor might warrant a modified
application of the Morgan “necessary and proper” inquiry in which the
judicial assessment of the necessity of congressional intervention would
turn on the availability of feasible alternative channels for remediation.
As applied to the Republican Guarantee Clause, the necessary prong of
this standard of review would have to have more bite than in other
applications. Consider, for example, the problem of partisan
gerrymanders. To survive judicial review, congressional legislation
seeking to remediate gerrymandering might be expected to include
evidence that neither the state courts nor the ordinary operations of the
states’ political processes would be likely to adequately address state
partisan gerrymanders. Congress might point to the exhaustion of legal
remedies in the state courts, as well as evidence of structural minority
rule in the drawing of state electoral districts.
The strength of Congress’s claim might also depend on other
developments in federal election law. For example, such a position
might be enhanced were the Supreme Court to reconsider its narrow
holding in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, in which a bare majority of the Court voted
to uphold the constitutionality of independent redistricting
commissions enacted by a state voter initiative as a permissible means
to redistrict state electoral districts under the Elections Clause of
Article I, Section 4.389 Because the composition of the Court has changed
since that decision, it is conceivable that a recomposed Court may be
inclined to revisit that holding in the future, something hinted at by the
dissent in Rucho.390 If voters were entirely unable to enact independent
state commissions themselves—as the Arizona Independent

389. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
390. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2524 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The
majority notes that voters themselves have recently approved ballot initiatives to put power over
districting in the hands of independent commissions or other non-partisan actors. Some Members
of the majority, of course, once thought such initiatives unconstitutional.” (citation omitted)).
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Redistricting Commission’s four dissenters would have held391—and if
partisan gerrymandering claims remain nonjusticiable by federal
courts,392 then this would seem to support a departmentalist
understanding of the Clause as permitting congressional intervention
as a last resort. That interpretation would permit Congress to
legislatively address partisan gerrymanders not remediable either by
state voters or federal courts, for it is difficult to think that an issue so
central to republican governance could not be remedied by any branch
of the federal government or by the people of the states themselves.
While the precise application of this approach would depend on
the legislation at issue and related juridical precedents, a
departmentalist-minded interpretation of the Clause seems especially
appropriate given that both the text and constitutional history of the
Clause has seemed to invite all federal branches to have some role in
developing the Clause’s meaning and application. Understood in this
way, the Clause would remain a “break glass in case of emergency”
constitutional provision to be invoked only when other constitutional
means have been exhausted or shown to be inadequate to resolving the
problem at hand. This framework would provide deference to Congress
when an intervention is necessary but would preserve as the primary
avenues for remediation the more ordinary constitutional mechanisms
for addressing disenfranchisement and concerns about fair political
participation.
CONCLUSION
Disagreements between the branches about the interpretation
and application of the Constitution are a necessary aspect of the
American constitutional order. Such disputes are especially fraught
when the Constitution does not clearly demarcate who may act and
what actions may be taken, as with the Republican Guarantee Clause.
The Clause presents the possibility of multiple guarantors and offers
very little textual guidance as to how each branch (and the states) might
interpret and enforce it. Legislative as well as judicial Reconstructionera precedents suggest that, at least in times of great urgency, Congress
(and the president) may meaningfully act under the Clause. Yet like so
much about the Civil War and the Reconstruction that followed, those
precedents may be so exceptional as to provide limited guidance for
more ordinary invocations of the Clause.

391. 135 S. Ct. at 2692 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
392. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484.
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Nevertheless, just as legal and scholarly efforts to reinvigorate
the Clause began to crest just before the 1960s civil rights revolution
found other constitutional avenues for federal legislative relief, the
present era suggests new momentum may be building for Congress to
act under the Clause once again.393 Such a movement would implicate
deep and ongoing tensions about the power of courts to second-guess
the political branches in matters that concern urgent (though not
exclusively) political questions. This Article has argued that the Court’s
increasingly juricentric approach, coupled with growing popular
agitation for Congress to take action to reform election procedures in
the states, suggests it may be only a matter of time before the Court
will be confronted with the task of clarifying what the Republican
Guarantee Clause means, and how Congress may legislate under it.
While the precise contours of this conflict remain to be seen, this Article
has sought to explore the argument that both Congress and the Court
have a role to play in enforcing and interpreting the Clause, presenting
the possibility for twenty-first-century constitutional departmentalism.

393. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

